Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub

tion was caused, precipitated or aggravated by his employment conditions, is sufficient to establish causal relation.1

Although the case record contains medical reports from several attending physicians, including Dr. Jarrell, Dr. DeCosta, Dr. Larmoyeux, and Dr. Chandler, the Board-certified neurosurgeon who performed both laminectomies, not one of these doctors expressed an opinion regarding causal relationship. A medical adviser of the Office negated causal relationship between appellant's employment and his back condition.

The Board finds that appellant failed to establish that his back condition was related to conditions of his employment.

The compensation order of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, formerly the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation, dated March 1, 1974, is hereby affirmed.

1 See Ruth R. Price, 16 ECAB 688; Herbert Fichandler, 16 ECAB 180; Eloise L. Berry, 25 ECAB 61; Mazimo Manadero, 25 ECAB 65.

In the Matter of PASQUALE VENTIMIGLIA and U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, U.S. POST OFFICE, East Patchogue, N.Y.

Schedule awards, vision, loss of

Where appellant was granted a schedule award for a 100 percent impairment of one eye but contended on appeal that he was entitled to additional compensation for the loss of vision he suffered at the time of surgery for a detached retina and for the possible future removal of the eye, he had been awarded the maximum amount of compensation to which he was entitled at the time.

Appellant would be entitled to further compensation at the expiration of the schedule award if it were established that his job-related eye injury resulted in a loss of wage-earning capacity.

Docket No. 74-161; Submitted on the Record;
Issued July 31, 1974

Before FLOYD G. ANSLEY, E. GERALD LAMBOLEY, FRED E. STRINE

The issue is whether appellant is entitled to compensation for more than 100 percent permanent loss of the use of his left eye, for which he received a schedule award.

On July 6, 1968, appellant, a letter carrier, was struck below the left eye by a stone while delivering mail. He was seen by Dr. Herbert Schmidt, a Board-certified ophthalmologist, on July 11,

1968, who on August 12, 1970, extracted a hypermature cataract of the left eye. In January 1972, appellant underwent surgery at the Veterans Administration Hospital in New York to repair a detached retina in his left eye.

On May 16, 1973, Dr. Melchur Garcia, Jr., an ophthalmologist, reported that appellant was practically blind in the left eye.

A medical adviser of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, formerly the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation, reviewed the case record and stated that appellant had a 100 percent impairment of the left eye which was related to the employment injury. By compensation order dated August 2, 1973, the Office granted appellant a schedule award for a 100 percent permanent impairment of his left eye and provided for the payment of compensation for a period of 160 weeks, from May 16, 1973 to June 8, 1976. Appellant was also paid temporary total disability compensation for the periods August 17, 1970 through September 30, 1970, and January 3, 1972 through March 3, 1972.

Appellant contends on appeal that he is entitled to additional compensation for the loss of vision he suffered at the time of the 1970 surgery and for the possible future removal of his left eye.

The Board finds that appellant has been awarded the maximum amount of compensation to which he is entitled at this time.1

Appellant would be entitled to further compensation upon the expiration of the schedule award on June 8, 1976 if it were established that his job related eye injury resulted in a loss of wage earning capacity. We note that the Office has recognized that possibility in the memorandum it filed on appeal.

The compensation order of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, formerly the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation, dated August 2, 1973 is hereby affirmed.

15 U.S.C. 8107(c)(5) provides, "Eye lost, 160 weeks' compensation." 5 U.S.C. 8107(c)(14) provides, "Compensation for loss of binocular vision or for loss of 80 percent or more of the vision of an eye is the same as for loss of the eye."

In the Matter of WILLIAM H. DUFF and DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, LEXINGTON-BLUE ARMY DEPOT, Lexington, Ky.

Subrogation-Procedure on appeal to or review by Board, jurisdic-
tion of Board

The Board has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Office in a
third party matter where the employee contends that he is entitled to
receive a greater amount in compensation benefits than that paid to

him by the Office; this is not a case where the administrating agency
is attempting to collect money from the employee.

Subrogation

Section 8132 specifically provides that the beneficiary of a third party recovery, after making certain deductions specified in the section, shall "refund to the United States the amount of compensation paid by the United States. ***" Where he has failed to make such refund, it is mandatory for the Office to offset the amount to which it is entitled under the section from future compensation payments. The requirements of section 8132 may not be waived or compromised.

Docket No. 74-112; Submitted on the Record;
Issued August 5, 1974

Before FLOYD G. ANSLEY, E. GERALD LAMBOLEY, FRED E. STRINE

The issue is whether it was proper for the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, formerly the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation, to deduct from compensation due to appellant a portion of a settlement he had obtained in litigation against a third party.

On February 19, 1970 appellant, a warehouse foreman, was injured when he was struck by a privately owned automobile while crossing a road on the premises of the employing establishment. He sustained a fracture of the right leg which required surgery. The Office determined that he had sustained a permanent partial impairment of the leg. A schedule award for a 5 percent loss of use of the limb was issued April 14, 1972. The gross amount awarded was $2,155.68, from which certain deductions respecting disability compensation previously paid to appellant were made, and the Office paid him a net amount of $346.57.

Appellant instituted a civil action against the driver of the car, and on June 29, 1972 the Office was advised that he had accepted a settlement of $20,000 in this litigation. On June 29, 1972, the Office advised him of the procedure which must be followed under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act in cases where an injury is caused by a third party. He was told that the Solicitor of the Department of Labor must be notified of any recovery or settlement obtained in a third party case, and that the Government must be reimbursed therefrom for any disbursements made by the Office in connection with the injury. When appellant did not respond to this communication, the Office on October 11, 1972 informed the Solicitor that he had obtained a $20,000 settlement and that the reimbursable disbursements it had made respecting

the injury comprised $9,362.04 in disability compensation payments and the $4,067.94 in medical expenses, making a total of $13,429.98.

The Solicitor advised appellant on December 12, 1972 that the Office had paid benefits and medical expenses aggregating $13,429.98 in his case and that the Act provides1 that, where there is a recovery from the party responsible for the injury, the Government must be reimbursed for its disbursements less "certain allowances provided for the claimants benefits." On January 26, 1973 the Solicitor, in reply to a letter from appellant stating that he would not make reimbursement, informed him that although the Office had expended the 13-plus thousand dollar figure, he need reimburse it "only $6,401.58, the amount remaining after deduction of 20 percent of the net recovery (gross recovery minus attorney's fee and legal costs), out-of-pocket medical expenses and the Government's proportionate share of the attorney's fee."

Appellant again advised the Solicitor on February 1, 1973 that he did not intend to make reimbursement. His reason for refusing was that the Office did not notify him of the reimbursement requirement until after he had settled his suit against the third party. He stated that had he known he was going to have to pay back such a subtantial sum he would not have settled for $20,000 but would have continued with the litigation.

Subsequently, the Office determined that the permanent impairment of appellant's right leg had increased. A second schedule award was issued on December 6, 1973 for a 25 percent permanent loss of use of the member. This entitled him to an additonal amount of $8,634.07, from which the Office deducted $6,401.58 as constituting a "third pary credit" under the statute. Appellant was paid the difference of $2,232.49 and the Office explained the matter to him by letter dated December 6, 1973. He appealed, contending that he was entitled to the full amount of $8,634.07.

The first question involved in this appeal relates to the Board's jurisdiction to review the compensation order and letter decision

15 U.S.C. Section 8132. This section reads as follows: "If an injury or death for which compensation is payable under this subchapter is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in a person other than the United States to pay damages, and a beneficiary entitled to compensation from the United States for that injury or death receives money or other property in satisfaction of that liability as a result of suit or settlement by him or in his behalf, the beneficiary, after deducting therefrom the costs of suit and a reasonable attorney's fee, shall refund to the United States the amount of compensation paid by the United States and credit any surplus on future payments of compensation payable to him for the same injury. The amount refunded to the United States shall be credited to the Employees' Compensation Fund. If compensation has not been paid to the beneficiary, he shall credit the money or property on compensation payable to him by the United States for the same injury. However, the beneficiary is entitled to retain at least one-fifth of the net amount of the money or other property remaining after the expenses of a suit or settlement have been deducted, plus an amount equivalent to a reasonable attorney's fee proportionate to the refund to the United States."

of December 6, 1973 by which the Office withheld a portion of the schedule award as a statutory offset. The Board has held that such jurisdiction was lacking in several section 8132 cases.2 However, as the Board stated in the Jackson3 case:

**** the present case is not an action where the administrating agency is attempting to collect money from the employee as was the sitution in the Weintraub, Erickson and Price cases. On the contrary, this is a third party matter where the employee contends that he is entitled to receive a greater amount in compensation benefits than that paid to him by the Office. Therefore, the Board has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Office, as in White H. Cantrell, 13 ECAB 490; William R. Lance, 18 ECAB 422, and Clemence R. Mendoza, 19 ECAB 33."

We hold that the Board has jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, we reach the merits of appellant's contentions that he should have been paid the full amount of the December 6, 1973 schedule award and that the sum which the Office offset against such award was improperly withheld from him.

The Board rejects appellant's contentions as being without merit. Section 8132 specifically provides that the beneficiary of a third party recovery, after making certain deductions specified in the section, shall "refund to the United States the amount of compensation paid by the United States ***." Where he has failed to make such refund, it is mandatory for the Office to offset the amount to which it is entitled under the section from future compensation payments, as it did here.4 The requirements of section 8132 may not be waived or compromised.

The compensation order and letter decision of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs effectuating such an offset, dated December 6, 1973, are hereby affirmed.

2 Arthur Weintraub, 13 ECAB 388; Glenn E. Erickson, 25 ECAB 9; William K. Price, 25 ECAB 18; Oscar F. DiSilvestro, 25 ECAB 297; Daniel Hodges, 25 ECAB 337.

John W. Jackson, 25 ECAB 153.

+ Clemence R. Mendoza, 19 ECAB 33.

In the Matter of JOHN LALLY and DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD, Mass.

Schedule awards, AMA tables, hearing, loss of

Since February 28, 1973 the Office has evaluated industrial hearing loss in accordance with standards of the National Institute for

« PředchozíPokračovat »