No such danger will exist in the case of an Arab minority in a democratic Jewish commonwealth. In many ways they will be among the most fortunately placed of all the children of Arabia. In any case it is to be hoped that as part of the post-war world there will be set up some international agency to concern itself with the position of ethnic and religious minorities everywhere. If that happens we would certainly agree that the Jewish commonwealth shall be subject to the same degree of scrutiny and supervision on the part of such an international agency or commission as will be applied to other countries. That would be my answer. Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Fulbright. Mr. FULBRIGHT. If you care to make any comment along the line of Mr. Vory's question, has any official action been taken with regard to the view of King Ibn Saud, of Saudi Arabia? Dr. NEUMANN. I know very little about that. I suppose you are referring to what was stated in the article in Life magazine. The future of Palestine and the Jewish National Home is a matter of interest to the whole civilized world; it cannot depend or be made to appear to depend upon the views of this or that Arab ruler. From the standpoint of international law, they have no more to say about the future of Palestine than we here about the future of Saudi Arabia, and as a practical matter, infinitely less. We don't even know how permanent is the present regime in the Arabia Peninsula. All in all it's only 20 years old. Before King Ibn Saud there was King Hussein and the Kingdom of the Hejaz. The two princes were rivals, each backed and financed by a different branch of the British Imperial administration. Such kingdoms come and go. Lawrence of Arabia referred to the present regime as a tyranny built on sand and cemented with blood, which will pass like so many others that preceded it. "Nothing static," he said, "will arise in the desert." Chairman BLOOM. Any further questions, Mr. Fulbright? Chairman BLOOм. Mr. Gerlach? Mr. SCHIFFLER. No questions. Chairman BLOOM. The Chair would like to state we have a couple of witnesses here from out of town. If you will bear with us for a while we will hear them. THE HUSSEIN-MCMAHON UNDERSTANDING (Supplementary documented note submitted by Dr. Emanuel Neumann) The Arabs have contended that, in accordance with the Hussein-McMahon understanding, Palestine was included in the area in which the British promised to help them obtain independence. The British Government and all of the British officials connected with the negotiations have repeatedly and consistently held that it was their intention to exclude Palestine from any commitments made. Sir Henry McMahon has put himself on record on two occasions (March 12, 1922; July 23, 1937), in letters to The Times to the effect that he definitely intended to exclude Palestine from the arrangements made and had reason to believe that Hussein understood this at the time. The British Government did not publish the complete text of the correspondence between McMahon and Hussein until recently. His Majesty's Government always maintained that the delay in publication had nothing to do with Palestine but was in the interests of other aspects of British policy. But the suppression of parts of the correspondence lent color to the Arab contentions. In 1939, however, in connection with the Round Table Conferences held in London before the issuance of the White Paper, a Committee was set up to examine the letters. The British were, at the time, anxious to find as much basis for Arab claims a they could. Nevertheless, the committee decided that "on a proper construction of the correspondence, Palestine was in fact excluded." 1 This view was confirmed by the Lord Chancellor who held that "the correspondence as a whole, and particularly the reservation in respect of French interests in Sir Henry McMahon's letter of the 24th of October, 1915, not only did exclude Palestine but should have been understood to do so * * * "2 The The British contention is that Palestine was excluded along with the northern parts of the Syrian coast. Palestine was not mentioned by name, but the explanation of this is very simple since Palestine did not exist at the time as a political entity. The district of Beirut, which is specifically excluded, extends through what is now the larger part of Northern Palestine. The Southern part known in those days as the Sanjak of Jerusalem was autonomous in Turkish times. reasons given by McMahon for excluding the Northern part of the coast apply with greater force to the Southern part of Syria contained in the Sanjak of Jerusalem. Moreover, Feisal, the emissary of Hussein at the Peace Conference in 1919, definitely stated that he agreed to the exclusion of Palestine from the areas for which the Arab requested independence. The clear and definite denials made by the British officials and statesmen of high standing receive additional support-if this were needed-from the fact that Hussein did not at the time claim that Palestine was included in the British promise, although later he made vague and equivocal statements which led others to believe that he did understand Palestine to be included in the British statement. The credibility of Hussein may be judged from the following thumbnail sketch made of him by John Van Ess in his recent book, Meet the Arab: "For a few years Hussein, in his new position as sherif and controller of the pilgrimage, made hay vigorously for himself, for he had his hand in pretty well everything that was lucrative. He sold the scant water supply to pilgrims at exorbitant prices, he controlled the sheep market where sacrifices were bought, he cornered the food supply and sold it again on his own terms, he forebore to punish looters, and gossip had it that he even shared the loot; in short he had his hand on everything save the air the people breathed and that, to be sure, was foul enough through lack of the most primitive sanitation." STATEMENTS BY BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES ON THE NEGOTIATIONS 1. Sir Henry McMahon's Letter to the Times, July 23, 1937: "Many references have been made in the Palestine Royal Commission Report and in the course of the recent debates in both Houses of Parliament to the 'McMahon Pledge,' especially to that portion of the pledge which concerns Palestine and of which one interpretation has been claimed by the Jews and another by the Arabs. "It has been suggested to me that continued silence on the part of the giver of the pledge may itself be misunderstood. "I feel, therefore, called upon to make some statement on the subject, but I will confine myself in doing so to the point now at issue-i. e., whether that portion of Syria now known as Palestine was or was not intended to be included in the territories in which the independence of the Arabs was guaranteed in my pledge, "I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that it was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised. "I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein." 2. Colonel C. E. Vickery, who was a master of Arabic, was sent from Cairo in 1920 on an official mission to inspect the original Arabic text as actually received by the Sherif. In a letter published in the Times on the 21st of February, 1939, referring to this visit, he wrote: "I read the letter through very slowly. * * * It was quite evident that Palestine was not included in the proposals to the King. * * I can say * most definitely that the whole of the King's demands were centered around Syria, and only around Syria. Time after time he referred to that vineyard, to the exclusion of any other claim or interest. He stated most emphatically that he did not concern himself at all with Palestine and had no desire to have suzerainty over it for himself or his successors." 1 Royal stitute of International Affairs. Great Britain and Palestine 1915-39, p. 6. 2 Great Britain, Statement of the Lord Chancellor, Cmd 5974, 1939, p. 46. 3. Sir Gilbert Clayton was closely associated with Sir Henry McMahon in the negotiations with the Sherif. On the 12th April, 1923, when he was Chief Secretary to the Government of Palestine, he gave Lord Samuel, then High Commissioner, the following note in reply to an enquiry as to the scope of the McMahon pledge: "I was in daily touch with Sir Henry McMahon throughout the negotiations with King Hussein, and made the preliminary drafts of all the letters. I can bear out the statement that it was never the intention that Palestine should be included in the general pledge given to the Sherif. The introductory words of Sir Henry's letter were thought at the time, perhaps erroneously, clearly to cover the point. It was, I think, obvious that the peculiar interests involved in Palestine precluded any definite pledges in regard to its future at so early a stage." OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 1. Statement of British Policy in Palestine, June 3rd, 1922 (Churchill White Paper), Cmd. 1700, p. 20: "That letter [October 24th, 1915, from McMahon to Hussein] is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge." 2. The Secretary of State for the Colonies (The Duke of Devonshire), House of Lords Official Report, March 1st, 1923, col. 233: "Whether they [the promises] were expressed in the best terms or not, it is perhaps not for me to say, but undoubtedly there never was any intention, when the pledge was given, to recognize the independence of the Arabs so as to include Palestine. I think that is perfectly clear, and in my own mind I am certain of it. Although the terms may not have been expressed language, I think it was the intention of both Sir H. McMahon and the Government at the time, when those pledges were given, that Palestine should not be included." 3. Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Ormsby-Gore), House of Commons, July 21st, 1937, House of Commons Official Report, July 21, 1937, col. 2249/50: "I served in 1916 in the Arab Bureau in Cairo on Sir Henry McMahon's staff, and I wish myself to testify to the fact that it never was in the mind of anyone on that staff that Palestine west of the Jordan was in the area within which the British Government then undertook to further the cause of Arab independence. * * * I want it clearly and finally understood that His Majesty's Government, neither then nor now, can or will admit that Palestine west of the Jordan was included in the pledge given to the Sherif, and that they have always in mind that special considerations must obtain in regard to the future government of the Holy Land. The unique character of Palestine was recognized by the Arab Delegates to the Peace Conference. It is recognized all over the world." THE WAR SERVICES OF THE ARABS (Supplementary documented note submitted by Dr. Emanuel Neumann) The Arab leaders have placed a great deal of emphasis on war services rendered to the Allies in the defeat of the Turks during the First World War. Arab tribesmen from the Hejaz and some from Transjordan were admittedly of help to the British although authorities differ as to how substantial this help was. But the Syrian and Palestinian Arabs who have been talking so much about their great contribution to the Allied war effort had nothing whatsoever to do with the matter. For the most part they remained passive, or worse, at times treacherously aided the Turks. While the Zionists do not stress the Jewish war services, nevertheless the fact is that they responded enthusiastically to whatever opportunities were offered them to fight with the British and to serve in special Jewish battalions. In Palestine alone about 1,200 Jews were recruited against 150 Arabs, although the Arab population was ten times that of the Jews. 95149-44-21 In accordance with the understanding between McMahon and Hussein the Syrian nationalists were to have raised the standard of revolt along with Hussein, but several of their leaders were executed by the Turks after the discovery of incriminating documents, the nationalists lost courage, and the uprising of the Syrians never came off. Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, waited to make sure that he was "backing the right horse." 1 In fact he did not move until the Turks, accompanied by a German military mission ostensibly on its way to Southern Arabia, approached his territory. Besides the promises of help in their struggle for independence from the Turks, the British subsidized Hussein very heavily. Sir Ronald Storrs, who acted the principal role in making the early arrangements with Hussein, estimates that the Arab revolt cost the British taxpayers the sum of £11,000,000, of which almost one million went to Hussein in the way of a monthly subsidy.2 The tribes from the Hejaz and Transjordan who took part in the revolt consisted of undisciplined tribesmen. The campaign was organized by British officers aided by Feisal and a few Syrian officers from the Turkish Army who had deserted. The general view of British military officers is that the contribution of the Arab forces was mainly confined to wrecking and looting operations in which there was little risk of loss of life. Although some of the writings of T. E. Lawrence, who played the chief part in organizing the Arab revolt, convey a more romantic impression, careful reading of The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which is the full account, confirms this view. SERVICES OF THE SYRIAN AND PALESTINE ARABS 1. Sir Philip Graves, The Land of Three Faiths, London, 1923, pp. 112-113: "Most annoying, to anyone who has served with the British and the Sherifian Arab forces in the Palestine campaign and knows something of the history of that campaign, are the pretensions of the Arabs of Palestine to have rendered important military services to the Allies in the Great War. "Many of the Transjordanians and the Hejazis, whom, for all their talk of Arab union, the Palestine Arabs dislike and fear as rude and hardy men, played their part right well under the inspiring leadership of Emir Feisal and Colonel T. E. Lawrence; but the Palestinians confined themselves to deserting in large numbers to the British, who fed and clothed and paid for the maintenance of many thousand such prisoners of war, few indeed of whom could be induced to obtain their liberty by serving in the Sherifian Army." 2. A. Biscoe Moore, The Mounted Riflemen in Syria and Palestine, pp. 64, 107, 156, 169: "They (the Arabs) were on many occasions suspected of carrying information to the Turks of British movements. They will do anything for material gain, a little loot or 'backsheesh,' and on more than one occasion were responsible for the deaths of New Zealanders. "Treacherous as the Bedouins are known to be, it was very necessary to keep well clear of their camps, as none of them would be above trying for a little 'backsheesh' from the Turks if they thought it could be obtained by giving warning of our approach. "Our men had suffered from the treachery of the natives throughout the campaign * * * and the feeling against them was to come to a head with tragic results." 3. C. S. Jarvis (late Governor of Sinai) Three Deserts, p. 302: "The Syrians as a people did nothing whatsoever towards assisting the Arabs cause except for the isolated action of some Bedouins in the very last stages of the campaign and the services of a few Syrian officers who deserted from the Turkish Army. The great mass of the Syrians did absolutely nothing beyond hold secret meetings and talk. The inhabitants of Palestine did rather less than this." 1 John de Vere Loder, The Truth About Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria, London, 1923, p. 18. 2 Ronald Storrs, Orientations, note, p. 177. FIGHTING QUALITIES OF THE TRIBESMEN FROM THE HEJAZ AND TRANSJORDAN * * * 1. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp. 103-104: "Blood feuds were nominally healed. All the same, the members of one tribe were shy of those of another, and within the tribe no man would quite trust his neighbour. Each might be, usually was, whole-hearted against the Turk, but perhaps not quite to the point of failing to work off a family grudge upon a family enemy in the field. Consequently they could not attack. company of Turks firmly entrenched in open country could have defied the entire army of them; and a pitched defeat, with its casualties, would have ended the war by sheer horror. One "I concluded that the tribesmen were good for defence only. Their acquisitive recklessness made them keen on booty, and whetted them to tear up railway, plunder caravans, and steal camels; but they were too free-minded to endure command, or to fight in team." 2. Major C. S. Jarvis, Three Deserts, p. 299-303, who spent eighteen years living and working with the Arabs describes the situation in even more realistic terms: * * * "The truth of the matter is that the national desire for independence was confined solely to the few educated Arabs in the cause, such as Feisal, and that among the fighting men and the sheikhs of the tribes who led them this feeling was conspicuous by its absence. The only method of keeping these patriots in the field was by payment in gold, and when the Arab sees gold his natural avarice causes him to lose all control of himself, so that squabbles as to the respective donations to various tribes were of daily occurrence. "In action they were entirely without discipline, and the first hint of loot meant that the greater part of the attacking force broke off the engagement before it was completed, to rifle the enemy's captured baggage. After a successful raid when the Arabs were loaded with looted corn and rations nothing would keep them in the field, and they trickled back to their tents and womenfolk so that a striking force on which their commander was relying for another attack on the railway would scatter into the desert in a night.' 3. Lieutenant Colonel Vickery, "Journal of the Central Asian Society," 1923, pt. 1, p. 57. "One Arab [says Vickery] had attracted my notice-one Saleh, and he was asked to act as chief of staff. He replied that he could only answer for his own men-thirty in all. On trying to form up the remainder, three hundred at once sat down on the beach, saying they were tired, and they had come ashore for a little rest and a sleep. They started to light fires, and were obviously not going to fight. I turned to the remainder, two hundred of whom at once announced that they were not fighting men; they had come to loot. Off they went along the seashore, saying that they would wait outside the town till I had captured it, an operation they hoped that I should execute with great promptitude, as they were in a hurry. The remainder condescended to follow us at the moment when the first gun of the S. N. O.'s flagship opened on the town. A seaplane which went up was received with a brisk fire by the Turkish garrison, and the observer was unfortunately killed. Shortly afterwards we ran into a Turkish patrol. We were lucky enough to shoot first, and dropped three of them, but it was enough for some 250 of the Arabs." SERVICES OF PALESTINIAN JEWS 1. Handbook of the Foreign Office, No. 60, 1920, pp. 62-63: "The most important event which has taken place so far as the Jewish community in Palestine is concerned, since our occupation, has been the recruiting of Palestine Jews, whatever their national status, into the British Army; and practically the whole available Jewish youth of the colonies, and many of the townsmen of military age came forward for voluntary enlistment in the Jewish battalions, took the oath to King George V, and were clad in British uniforms. The initiative in favour of the recruiting movement took place as the result of the demand of the Jewish population itself, rather than from any desire or even encouragement from the British authorities. The campaign in Palestine is regarded by the Jews as a campaign for the liberation of the country from the thraldom of Turkish misrule, and the return of even Turkish suzerainty would be regarded by them as a betrayal." |