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Estes vs. The State of Georgia. inflicting a permanent and dangerous wound-such a wound that excitement will endanger him for life, in the opinion of the physicians who examined him. He was sober enough, too, to get off rapidly from the place of the shooting, nor is there any motive suggested by the proof to rebut the idea of a malicious intent, a careless disregard of human life. We all think, therefore, that there was no error in the refusal to charge as requested under the facts of this case.
For myself, I think that a man cannot voluntarily make himself so drunk as if he shoot and kill another without provocation, the crime will be graded or reduced from murder to manslaughter; or if he shoot at another without provocation the crime can be made by drunkenness less than assault with intent to murder. The statute is plain that voluntary drunkenness shall be no excuse, and if it be made to lower or grade the crime, to lessen it in any case whatever, it is thereby made some excuse ; and that, pro tanto, fritters away the solidity and power of the statute. I agree fully with the decisions of this court, in 17 Georgia, 146 ; 25 Ibid., 527; and 31 Ibid., 424; and with the dissent of Judge Lyon from the judgment rendered in 29 Ibid., 594. My brethren agree with me that drunkenness is no excuse for crime, and that the court did not err in so charging, and that the court was right in this case in refusing the request asked for; but we did not consult and agree as to the effect of voluntary drunkenness upon intention in any case, or its effect in reducing or paliating crime under our statute, in any case, and therefore I am not at liberty to commit the court further than to the principles announced in the syllabus.
The Mayor, etc., of Savannah vs. Dehoney et al.
55 66 66
THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF SAVANNAH,
plaintiff in error, vs. MARCUS A. DEHONEY et al., defendants in error.
Where the owners or lessees of public stables were taxed by an ordinance of
the city of Savannah, which also contained a provision that every person engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, wares, merchandise, passengers, or baggage for hire, by means of wagons, drays, trucks, carts, omnibuses or carriages of any description, or of letting carriages and other vehicles for hire, shall pay a tax according to the number and character of the vehicles employed in such business, specifying the tax, and the complainants having paid the first tax, prayed that the collection of the second might be enjoined, presenting to the chancellor several affidaavits showing that the latter business had, in the city of Savannah, always
been incident to the former : Held, that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in granting the injunc
Injuction. Tax. Before Judge TOMPKINS. county. At Chambers. July 26, 1875.
Reported in the decision.
WILLIAM S. BASINGER, by JACKSON & CLARKE, for plaintiff in error.
RUFUS E. LESTER; MELDRIM & ADAMS, for defendants.
WARNER, Chief Justice.
This was a bill filed by the complainant against the defendant, praying for an injunction to restrain it from the collection of a tax imposed by the sixth section of an ordinance of the city of Savannah, to assess and levy taxes to raise revenue for said city, which provides “that every person engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, wares, merchandise, passengers or baggage, for hire, by means of wagons, drays, trucks, carts, omnibusses, or carriages of any description, or of letting carriages and other vehicles for hire, shall pay a tax according to the number and character of the vehicles employed in such business,” to-wit: specify
The Mayor, etc., of Savannah vs. Dehoney et al.
ing the tax to be paid. By the same ordinance it is provided " that every owner or owners, lessee or lessees of a public stable shall pay a tax of $100 00.” The question made by the complainants is, that being taxed $100 00 on their business as the owners and keepers of a public stable in the city, it is a part of their legitimate business and incident thereto, as the owners and keepers of a public stable, to engage in carrying passengers and baggage in omnibusses or carriages, for hire, without paying any additional tax besides the $100 00. On the hearing of the motion for an injunction, and after considering the bill, the defendant's answer, and the several affidavits read at the hearing, the presiding judge granted the injunction, whereupon the defendant excepted.
If it was a part of the legitimate business of the complainants, and incident thereto, as the owners and keepers of a public stable in the city, to engage in the carrying of passengers and baggage in omnibusses or carriages, for hire, then they were not liable to be twice taxed on that business. Whether the engaging in carrying passengers and baggage in omnibusses or carriages, for hire, was a part of the legitimate business, and incident thereto, of the complainants, as the owners and keepers of a public stable in the city, is a question of fact to be decided on the final hearing of the cause, under the evidence. The evidence before the judge, on the hearing of the motion for the injunction, was decidedly in favor of the complainants in relation to this point in the case.
It was insisted on the argument here that the injunction should not have been granted, because there was no equity in the complainants' bill, they having an adequate remedy at common law, by an affidavit of illegality. The defendant did not demur to the bill for want of equity, but filed its answer thereto, besides no execution or distress warrant for the tax claimed had been levied on the property of the complainants. If such had been the case, we will not say that an affidavit of illegality would not have been the proper remedy. In Vanover et al. vs. The Justices, etc., 27th Georgia Reports, 354, it was held that the act of 1804, prohibiting judicial interfer
Simmons vs. Moseley.
ence with the levy and collection of taxes imposed by that act, did not extend to corporation taxes. In this case there are several complainants asserting the same right against the defendant, and one decision will prevent a multiplicity of suits. In view of the evidence before the presiding judge, as contained in the record, we will not control the exercise of his discretion in granting the injunction prayed for.
Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed.
35 55 87 58 149 70 309
SAMUEL SIMMONS, plaintiff in error, vs. WILLIAM M. MOSE
LEY, administrator, defendant in error. 1. The limitation act of 1869 is a bar to an action commenced-March 6th'
1874, upon a promissory note dated and due in 1858, the maker of which removed from Georgia to Texas, in 1859, and died there in 1863, although
no administration upon his estate was granted in Georgia until May, 1872. 2. The bar of the statute attaches because the creditor did not bring suit with
in a period of time after the administrator became subject to suit, equal to that prescribed by the act where no impediment to suit existed at the time of its passage. The case is within the letter of the statute; and when released from the letter, by way of implied exception on account of death and want of representation, it is still within the spirit of it, for the above reason: Taylor vs. Jacoway, 50 Georgia Reports, 382. Besides, it was in the power of the creditor, the debtor having left real estate in Georgia, to have administered, or forced administration, earlier, and exercised more diligence in that way: 11 Georgia Reports, 651, 653 ; 19 Ibid., 316.
Statute of limitations. Before Judge UNDERWOOD. Chattooga Superior Court. March Term, 1875.
ALEXANDER & WRIGHT; F. A. KIRBY, for plaintiff in
DABNEY & FOUCHE, for defendant.
The opinion of the court, and all the material facts, appear in the head-notes. The judgment of the court below sus
The National Bank of Augusta vs. The Southern, etc., Company et al.
tained the plea of the statute of limitations, and that judgment is affirmed.
55 36 55 196 58 190 59 380
THE NATIONAL BANK OF AUGUSTA, plaintiff in error, vs.
THE SOUTHERN PORCELAIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY
et al., defendants in error. 1. The act of August 23d, 1872, which authorizes persons other than the de
fendants of record, to make, under oath, pleas in defense of suits to which they are not parties, is in conflict with article w., section 4, paragraph 5,
of the constitution, and therefore is unconstitutional and void. 2. A manufacturing company incorporated by the legislature of South Caro
lina, but which transạcted its business and had its principal office in Georgia, and became indebted under and by virtue of contracts made in Georgia, is liable to suits upon such contracts in the courts of Georgia, though at the time of the institution of the suits no business is being done by the company, the president of the company and a majority of the stockholders having always resided, and still residing, in Georgia, all the meetings of the stockholders having been held in Georgia, the books being in Georgia in the hands of the president, and a notice for a meeting of the stockholders in Georgia pending at the time of the commencement of the suits, the company having at that time no office or place of business anywhere in South
Carolina. 3. Service upon the president of the company in the county of Richmond,
where he resided at the commencement of the action, and where the books of the company were, and where the stockholders were under notice to meet, is sufficient service upon the company.
Constitutional law. Pleadings. Corporations. Jurisdiction. Service. Before Judge Gibson. Richmond Superior Court. October Term, 1874.
Reported in the opinion.
FRANK H. MILLER, for plaintiff in error.
BARNES & CUMMING, for defendants.
This action was brought for the recovery of a large sum of money due the plaintiff by the defendant upon contracts made