that the plaintiff's right to one free dismissal also secures the right to file baseless papers. The filing of complaints, papers, or other motions without taking the necessary care in their preparation is a separate abuse of the judicial system, subject to separate sanction. As noted above, a voluntary dismissal does not eliminate the Rule 11 violation. Baseless filing puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening courts and individuals alike with needless expense and delay. Even if the careless litigant quickly dismisses the action, the harm triggering Rule 11's concerns has already occurred. Therefore, a litigant who violates Rule 11 merits sanctions even after a dismissal. Moreover, the imposition of such sanctions on abusive litigants is useful to deter such misconduct. If a litigant could purge his violation of Rule 11 merely by taking a dismissal, he would lose all incentive to "stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers." Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F. R. D. 165, 192 (1983) (Letter from Judge Walter Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules) (Mar. 9, 1982).

We conclude that petitioner's voluntary dismissal did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction to consider respondents' Rule 11 motion. Although Rule 11 does not establish a deadline for the imposition of sanctions, the Advisory Committee did not contemplate that there would be a lengthy delay prior to their imposition, such as occurred in this case. Rather, "it is anticipated that in the case of pleadings the sanctions issue under Rule 11 normally will be determined at the end of the litigation, and in the case of motions at the time when the motion is decided or shortly thereafter." Advisory Committee Note on Rule 11, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 576. District courts may, of course, "adopt local rules establishing timeliness standards," White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U. S., at 454, for filing and deciding Rule 11 motions.

Petitioner further contends that the Court of Appeals did not apply a sufficiently rigorous standard in reviewing the District Court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 11 involves a consideration of three types of issues. The court must consider factual questions regarding the nature of the attorney's prefiling inquiry and the factual basis of the pleading or other paper. Legal issues are raised in considering whether a pleading is "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument" for changing the law and whether the attorney's conduct violated Rule 11. Finally, the district court must exercise its discretion to tailor an "appropriate sanction."

The Court of Appeals in this case did not specify the applicable standard of review. There is, however, precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit for applying an abuse-ofdiscretion standard to the determination whether a filing had an insufficient factual basis or was interposed for an improper purpose, but reviewing de novo the question whether a pleading or motion is legally sufficient. See, e. g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America (Airline Div.) v. Association of Flight Attendants, 274 U. S. App. D. C. 370, 373, 864 F. 2d 173, 176 (1988); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 248 U. S. App. D. C., at 261, 770 F. 2d, at 1174-1175. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted the appropriate approach. That Circuit reviews findings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous standard, the determination that counsel violated Rule 11 under a de novo standard, and the choice of sanction under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F. 2d 823, 828 (1986). The majority of Circuits follow neither approach; rather, they apply a deferential standard to all issues raised by a Rule 11 violation. See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F. 2d 746, 757-758 (CA1 1988); Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.

2d 66, 68 (CA3), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 848 (1988); Stevens v. Lawyers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of North Carolina, 789 F. 2d 1056, 1060 (CA4 1986); Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 836 F. 2d 866, 872 (CA5 1988) (en banc); Century Products, Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F. 2d 247, 250 (CA6 1988); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N. A., 880 F. 2d 928, 933 (CA7 1989); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F. 2d 668, 673 (CA10 1988).

Although the Courts of Appeals use different verbal formulas to characterize their standards of review, the scope of actual disagreement is narrow. No dispute exists that the appellate courts should review the district court's selection of a sanction under a deferential standard. In directing the district court to impose an "appropriate" sanction, Rule 11 itself indicates that the district court is empowered to exercise its discretion. See also Advisory Committee Note on Rule 11, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 576 (suggesting that a district court "has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well acquainted").

The Circuits also agree that, in the absence of any language to the contrary in Rule 11, courts should adhere to their usual practice of reviewing the district court's findings of fact under a deferential standard. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a) (“Findings of fact. . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses”). In practice, the "clearly erroneous" standard requires the appellate court to uphold any district court determination that falls within a broad range of permissible conclusions. See, e. g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 573–574 (1985) (“If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice

between them cannot be clearly erroneous"); Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 857-858 (1982). When an appellate court reviews a district court's factual findings, the abuse-of-discretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable: A court of appeals would be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous.

The scope of disagreement over the appropriate standard of review can thus be confined to a narrow issue: whether the court of appeals must defer to the district court's legal conclusions in Rule 11 proceedings. A number of factors have led the majority of Circuits, see supra, at 399-400, as well as a number of commentators, see, e. g., C. Shaffer & P. Sandler, Sanctions: Rule 11 and Other Powers 14-15 (2d ed. 1988) (hereinafter Shaffer & Sandler); American Judicature Society, Rule 11 in Transition, The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, pp. 45-49 (Burbank, reporter 1989), to conclude that appellate courts should review all aspects of a district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions under a deferential standard.

The Court has long noted the difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 288 (1982) (“Rule 52(a) does not furnish particular guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact. Nor do we yet know of any other rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion"). Making such distinctions is particularly difficult in the Rule 11 context. Rather than mandating an inquiry into purely legal questions, such as whether the attorney's legal argument was correct, the Rule requires a court to consider issues rooted in factual determinations. For example, to determine whether an attorney's prefiling inquiry was reasonable, a court must consider all the circumstances of a case. An inquiry that is unreasonable when an attorney has months to prepare a complaint may be reasonable when he has only a

few days before the statute of limitations runs. In considering whether a complaint was supported by fact and law "to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief,” a court must make some assessment of the signer's credibility. Issues involving credibility are normally considered factual matters. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52; see also United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326, 332 (1952). The considerations involved in the Rule 11 context are similar to those involved in determining negligence, which is generally reviewed deferentially. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N. A., supra, at 932; see also 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2590 (1971); McAllister v. United States, 348 U. S. 19, 20-22 (1954) (holding that the District Court's findings of negligence were not clearly erroneous). Familiar with the issues and litigants, the district court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by Rule 11. Of course, this standard would not preclude the appellate court's correction of a district court's legal errors, e. g., determining that Rule 11 sanctions could be imposed upon the signing attorney's law firm, see Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U. S. 120 (1989), or relying on a materially incorrect view of the relevant law in determining that a pleading was not "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument" for changing the law. An appellate court would be justified in concluding that, in making such errors, the district court abused its discretion. "[I]f a district court's findings rest on an erroneous view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis." Pullman-Standard v. Swint, supra, at 287. See also Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U. S. 709, 714 (1986) ("If [the Court of Appeals] believed that the District Court's factual findings were unassailable, but that the proper rule of law was misapplied to those findings, it could have reversed the District Court's judgment").