serious than French influence.' The only literary association which has exercised a more than ephemeral influence upon Rumanian life was the Junimea,' founded in Jassy, in 1865, by a group of brilliant young men educated in Germany. From it sprang the advanced Conservative party whose members are known as 'Junimishti'; and it is significant to find some of its founders and most distinguished members (MM. Carp, Maiorescu, etc.) voicing now that part of Rumanian public opinion which shows pro-German sympathies.

Leaving aside the purely economic and financial intrusion, how is it that, notwithstanding the deep divergence between the German and Rumanian points of view, Deutschtum has so freely developed in the Danubian kingdom? Firstly, because the spiritual life of the country was in its infancy and readily responsive to the maturer influence which Germany alone chose to exert. Secondly-and here I must repeat that the Austrians form the large majority of the Germanic population of Rumania-because the various German associations have set themselves the task of creating a 'spiritual home' for the numerous German colonists, and of giving those natives who desire it the opportunity of getting into touch with German civilisation, while refraining generally from making this connexion oppressive or from interfering in Rumanian affairs.

The preceding pages will have illustrated sufficiently the extent to which Rumania is tied to Germany. But it is just because Germany is in the position to exert much influence in Rumania that, from the moment when this influence becomes oppressive, and in proportion as it is felt to be so, the reaction against it will set in. From the point of view of economic relations, Rumania was free fifty years ago to choose her friend; but only one hand was stretched out, and, whether she liked the feel of it or not, Rumania had to accept it. That hand now grips her fast, nor can she, however desirous, loosen its clasp unaided.

The present situation in the Near East proves only too clearly how unfortunate were the policies of France and England in the past. The complete abandonment of the south-eastern European states to the action of German politics has meant not only the loss of an

economic market for French and English goods, but also of a political nursery for French and English democratic ideals. Consider the following striking contrast. Notwithstanding their existing liberal constitutions, the crown can wield an almost autocratic power in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece, two of which are under German dynasties, while all have been subjected to strong German influence. Serbia, on the other hand, which is ruled by native princes and has always been loth to submit to Teutonic intrusion, has remained, in spite of difficulties of government, a true democratic polity. There is now undoubtedly an opportunity of making good past errors. Rumania will the more gladly welcome such a change, as her place in the lap of the Central Powers, with Bulgaria sitting on her knees, must be at once uncomfortable and not a little alarming. But there is one point which the Allies must not overlook. The great difficulty in dealing with Rumania is her situation with regard to Russia. What the policy of Russia will be in the future no one can predict. But it is clear that Rumania's position is very delicate; politically, because she would never be able to withstand a pressure from the North; economically, because she depends for her trade upon the Black Sea and the Straits. In these circumstances she must either be made secure against Russia, or she will of necessity, and with no other possible alternative, grow to depend more and more upon the Central Powers. This would mean-the considerations applying with equal force to the other south-eastern European states-a definite step towards the realisation of that Teutonic conception of 'Mitteleuropa' which we may now hope will never become a fact.

D. MITRANY.

Art. 6.-EGYPT AND PALESTINE.

1. Zionism and the Jewish Future. By various writers. Edited by H. Sacher. Murray, 1916.

2. Palästina-Handbuch. By Davis Trietsch. Third edition. Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1912.

3. The Anglo-Palestine Company. An Account of the Work of the Bank and its Branches during the years 1903-1913. London: 1913.

4. Diplomatic and Consular Reports: Turkey. (1) On the Trade and Commerce of Beirut and the Coast of Syria; (2) On the Trade of the Consular District of Jerusalem. Reports for the Year 1913; Nos. 5302, 5339.

5. Die Jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas. Eine Volkswirtschaftliche Untersuchung ihrer Grundlagen. By Curt Nawratzki. Munich: Reinhardt, 1914.

6. The Wilderness of Zin. By C. L. Woolley and T. E. Lawrence. Palestine Exploration Fund, 1915.

7. Fifty Years' Work in the Holy Land. A Record and a Summary, 1865-1915. By Sir C. M. Watson. Pal. Expl. Fund, 1915.

8. Recent Jewish Progress in Palestine. By Henrietta Szold. Philadelphia: Jewish Publ. Society, 1915. 9. Palestine and the Powers. By F. G. Jannaway. Birmingham: Walker, 1915.

AT intervals during the past eighteen months the attention of the British public has been bestowed more intently than had for long previously been the case upon Egypt; and, almost for the first occasion since the Suez Canal became a British interest, its safety has been a matter of concern. In England the security of the Canal and of Egypt had been taken generally as a matter of course. This, however, was not the case on the Continent, as is shown by the following quotation from a recent work by Dr Paul Rohrbach, only one of many continental publicists who have devoted their attention to the Near East:

'A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out of the question; the prospect of a German invasion of England is a fantastic dream. It is necessary to discover another combination in order to hit England in a vulnerable spot-and here we come to the point where the relationship of

Germany to Turkey, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, become of decisive importance for German foreign policy, based as it now is upon watchfulness in the direction of England.... England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place-Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal and of her connexions with India and the Far East, but would probably entail the loss also of her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan power, like Turkey, would also imperil England's hold over her sixty million Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. . . . The stronger Turkey grows, the more dangerous does she become for England. . . . Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war with England.' *

Dr Rohrbach rightly emphasises the importance to the British Empire, not so much of Egypt-although the control of this great country is an asset the value of which it is not easy to overrate-as of the Suez Canal. The principal British interest in the Eastern Mediter- . ranean is, in fact, the safeguarding of the shortest route to India and the Far East. Egypt is of course of great value to the Empire, but the Canal is of still greater. The Empire could continue to live and to flourish without Egypt, provided that the free passage through the Canal were safeguarded. If, however, that were lost, the two halves of the Empire would be severed from one another. In these days, when time is so essential a factor in all military matters, the duration of a voyage from Gibraltar or Malta to the Persian Gulf or Bombay by way of the Cape, which would take twice as long as one from Toulon or Trieste by the Canal, must prove a

* Dr Paul Rohrbach, 'Die Bagdadbahn.' Second edition. Berlin: 1911. Pp. 18, 19. The italics are Dr Rohrbach's.

fatal handicap to British interests. The great value of Egypt to the Empire is in fact the protection it gives to the Canal on the west; and, so long as Egypt is in British hands, the Canal is safe so far as the African side is concerned.

The security of the African shore of the Canal is, however, not the whole solution of the problem. The Asiatic shore also has to be safeguarded. Since the dawn of history until last century—one is almost justified in saying, until the present day-the struggle between Asia and Egypt has been almost continuous. The Hyksos, the Hittites, the Assyrians, the Crusaders and many another conquering race invaded Egypt; and their road always ran through Palestine. On the other hand, Asia has in the course of history been frequently invaded and partially overrun by Egyptian rulers, from the days of Amasis and Thothmes of the XVIII Dynasty until those of Mehemet Ali, eighty years ago. And the Egyptian forces also have invariably marched through the Wilderness of Zin and Palestine. In fact, the history of Palestine has been that of a shuttlecock, now under the control or influence of Egypt, now under that of one of the empires of Asia, seldom and for very brief periods free of both. In this respect, as in so many others, history does not change; she appears under different guises. The present war has shown that it is quite practicable for an Asiatic army to march from Asia to the borders of Egypt. The weakness of the Turks in the campaign of 1914-15 safeguarded the Canal from serious danger, but there can be no guarantee that the circumstances will always be similarly favourable to British interests. On the next occasion on which Egypt is threatened from the Asiatic side the threat may have far more force and skill behind it. The danger will then be great.

The Anglo-Egyptian government has recognised the unsatisfactory strategic situation in the region of the Canal by drawing its boundary, not at the natural frontier, where Asia and Africa meet, but further east, including some 37,000 square miles of Asiatic territory, more than twice the extent of Turkish Palestine, within the Egyptian dominions. This region-the El-Arish district, the Wilderness of Zin and the Sinai Peninsulais very sparsely inhabited, and is generally considered