Amis vs. Cameron. 23 Ibid., 142; 13 Ibid., 478; 6 Ibid., 443; 3 Kelly, 422. This rule we have no purpose or wish to disturb; but we cannot recognize the extension of it, so as to bind creditors by mere contract administration, unless they have assented to it. They are entitled to call for legal administration, and here there has been none. 2. The executors took upon themselves the legal obligation to execute the will according to law. They qualified, and then they cut loose from the ordinary and from the control of the statute, and put themselves under the private contract into which they had entered with the other legatees. They returned no inventory, no appraisement, no sales, no receipts, no disbursements. They made no return to the ordinary of any kind. The administration which they conducted was not even carried into the ordinary's office, much less carried through it. It was not the public, official administration which the law requires, but a private administration, governed by the wishes of themselves and their co-legatees instead of the law of the land. It was commenced, prosecuted and concluded wholly outside of the office which the law had appointed for it to pass through. A creditor searching that office could not discover what, if any assets, had come to the hands of the executors. The statute under which they qualified (Cobb's Digest, 188; 8 Georgia Reports, 399,) required them to return an inventory, on pain of being held liable to creditors as executors de son tort. This stringent statute they violated. It is true they published a legal notice to creditors warning them to render in their demands, but against what assets were they to make claim? The executors had charged themselves with none in that place where creditors, in all cases, as the law then stood, were entitled to look for the information. If they had complied with that requisite of the statute, this creditor, who may not have seen their advertisement, might have discovered that they were in a situation to make payment. The law, at least, entitled him to that means of information, as well as to the published notice. He did not respond to the notice, and they did not comply with the Amis vs. Cameron. law. Upon what principle can they, who were themselves in default, insist that they shall stand discharged because of his failure? On the facts in the record, we do not think the executors have supported their plea. They were chargeable with a large amount of assets, for which they have not legally accounted. They are to be deemed, in law, as having them still in hand, and are responsible for their production to satisfy this creditor. 3. The court, on the trial, made a charge to the jury subject of evidence which we cannot indorse. The conflict, if any, was between the plaintiff's witness on one side, who was disinterested, and the defendants themselves, on the other. We do not see that there was conflict; but suppose there was, the jury could not be bound to believe or disbelieve. They were the judges of credibility, and had a right to take interest into account, as well as the elements mentioned by the court. Opportunity, means of information, number, interest, are all to be considered; but at last the jury must be free to weigh the evidence, credit or discredit the witnesses, find out the truth, and follow it: 39 Georgia Reports, 597; 42 Ibid., 64; 43 Ibid, 283. Even putting interest out of the question, the court hampered the jury rather too much on the consequences of mere number: 10 Georgia Reports, 184. The charge in relation to positive and negative evidence was not error in itself, and to one point presented at the trial it seems to have been applicable. What the court stated to the jury as to the complication and difficulty of the case cannot be harmonized with the views which we have presented, but to pronounce it error in law would be to treat it with a seriousness out of proportion with its importance. Such remarks are usually intended to tone the minds of jurors to a sufficient pitch of gravity; and perhaps the only effect is to make them investigate the facts more carefully, and form their verdict with greater deliberation. If so, they are harmless. The assignments of error are numerous, and we have not Lockett vs. de Neufville et al. dealt with them all separately, but the principles laid down will be found to control them substantially. Judgment reversed. 55 454 93 648 93 699 BENJAMIN G. LOCKETT, plaintiff in error, vs. JACOB DE- 1. The statute (Code section 3266) requiring bond from the plaintiff in attachment, with good security, in an amount at least double the debt sworn to, contemplates, not only that the bond shall be for that amount, but that the security shall be good for the like amount. It is not the purpose of the statute to exact bond in double the debt and security for less; nor is it the province of the officer who takes the bond and judges of the security, to conjecture what may be the probable, or the possible, limit of the defendant's damages. He is authorized to accept no bond for a less amount than double the debt, nor any security except security good for at least that amount. 2. In a proceeding under the act of 1873, (Code, section 3271) to verify the sufficiency of the bond, and to have it made good, if not so already, the officer is to be governed by a like standard of security, and to pronounce none sufficient which is not good for an amount double the debt. 3. In that proceeding no question of amendment can be entertained, except amendment of the bond, and of that only in so far as may be necessary to make it conform to law as a bond in support of the attachment as originally issued and levied. 4. If, in such proceeding, an order to make the bond good, be not complied with within the time prescribed, the proper final order is one declaring the plaintiff's default, and directing the levying officer to dismiss the levy. To order that the attachment and the levy be dismissed, is error. Attachment. Bond. Amendment. Before Judge WRIGHT. Reported in the opinion. B. H. HILL & SON; SMITH & JONES, for plaintiff in error. JOSEPH GANAHL; WARREN & HOBBS, for defendants. Lockett vs. de Neufville et al. BLECKLEY, Judge. Judge Strozer of the Albany circuit issued an attachment in favor of the plaintiff in error against the defendants in error, for three quarters of a million of dollars. After it was levied, a proceeding took place before Judge Wright, the successor or Judge Strozer, to verify the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, in the mode prescribed by the act of 1873, (Code, section 3271.) In the course of that proceeding Judge Wright held that the bond was not sufficiently secured, and ordered that additional security be given within a prescribed time, so as to make the bond secure, to at least the amount of the debt sworn to. Compliance with this order was attempted, on the part of the plaintiff, but at the final hearing, the Judge decided that he had failed to comply, and ordered that the attachment and the levy thereon be dismissed. It is not pretended that the security was good for double the debt sworn to, and therefore, in the view we take of the case, it is quite immaterial whether the Judge ruled correctly` or not in holding that because of the want of full ratification by one of the sureties whose name was signed by his attorney in fact, or for any other reason, the bond was not well secured to the extent of the amount of the debt only. If in trying to follow one error the judge committed another, the result ought to be accepted if it be a correct result; and we think that the rejection of this bond was proper, because it did not come up to the standard of security which the law lays down, whether it came up to the different and lower standard laid down by the judge or not. 1. The Code declares, section 3266, that "the party seeking the attachment, before the same issues, shall also give bond, with good security, in an amount at least double the debt sworn to, payable to the defendant in attachment, conditioned to pay such defendant all damages that he may sustain, and also all costs that may be incurred by him in consequence of suing out the attachment in the event the plaintiff shall fail to recover in said case." This provision is perfectly plain. Lockett vs. de Neufville et al. Its obvious meaning is that the bond must be for at least double the debt, and, when for the minimum amount, that the security must be good for the whole bond, not for part of it only. There is no hint that the bond is to be for one amount and the security good for another amount. Double the debt is made the standard for both. Either of them, if is no limit in that the plaintiff choose, may go above; there direction; but neither can fall below. Double the debt, at least, is the stern mandate of the law, and plaintiffs in attachment must comply with it or forbear the use of this remedy. The legislature grants the remedy on terms, and whoever will not or cannot comply with these terms must look to the other modes provided by the law for prosecuting their rights. The giving, not only of bond, but of good security, in double the amount of the debt sworn to, is a condition precedent to the issuing of attachment. And that condition the officer to whom application is made for the writ, has no right to waive or relax. Nor has he any right to speculate upon the probable or the possible limit of the defendant's damages. It is not for him to foresee what property will be levied upon, how long the litigation will linger, or what may be the consequences, in any respect, of the proceeding. The law trusts him with no such questions. It is said that the object of the bond is indemnity only. That is true; but what will be indemnity has been settled by the legislature. According to the plainly declared will of the legislature a defendant in attachment is entitled to be indemnified against damages and costs by bond and good security to the extent of double the debt sworn to. It may be that no case will ever happen which, in the actual damages sustained and costs incurred, will exhaust all the indemnity which the law affords; but such a case might happen, and whether it might or not, no less indemnity than that prescribed, can be forced upon a party by any court or officer. Were the reasonableness of the law in question, it might be urged in favor of it, that the plaintiff is burdened with giving good security once for all, and that security, worth twice the debt when the attachment was sued out, may, by changes and |