rational expectations, when founded merely on past experience, may be fuddenly difappointed, from a change of circumftances. It is for this reafon that philofophers never depend very firmly on mere matters of fact; but endeavour to penetrate into the motives or efficient caufes of fuch fact; in order to qualify themfelves to judge where they are to make exceptions to general rules. For it is from reafon only that we are capable of laying down fure and certain general rules, and of fupplying those which are not fuch, with proper exceptions; by which means, and by which only, we may hope at length to arrive at those abfolute connections, which fubfift between the causes of things and their neceffary confequences. It is the knowlege of thefe connections that oftentimes enables us to foresee the confequences of things merely hypothetical; that is, without the neceffity of having recourfe to experience, or to the perceptible connections of palpable objects; to which the brutes are conftantly reduced. And hence we fee, that the doctrine of innate ideas, or the internal principles of neceffary truths, includes the effential distinction that fubfifts between man and the brute creation.'

• Perhaps, continues Mr. Leibnitz, the very ingenious effayift, [Mr. Locke] does not diffent from us altogether in this particular; for, after having taken up his whole firft book in combating the doctrine of innate ideas, taken in a certain fenfe, he admits, notwithstanding, at the beginning of the fecond, that thofe ideas which do not immediately arife from fenfation deduce their origin from reflection. Now, reflection is nothing more than our attention to what is already innate; which is not communicated from without by means of the fenfes. This being the cafe; can it be denied that there is a great deal innate in the mind? Since we are innate, if I may fo fay, to ourselves, and poffefs being, unity, fubftance, duration, change, action, perception, pleafure, and a thousand other objects of ideas purely intellectual? Instead of making ufe of the comparison of the philofopher's tabula rafa, or a plain piece of marble, I should prefer therefore a piece of marble that is originally veined: for if the foul refemble a tablet perfectly clear and plain, the truths impressed on it are like the figure of an Hercules, for inftance, that is fculptured on it; to which figure it was totally as indifferent as to any other. But if the piece of marble be already veined, and the configuration of its veins prefent the figure of an Hercules, in preference to all others; that figure may be justly faid to be innate, notwithftanding it may require confiderable labour to cut and polish the furface of fuch marble, in order to render the figure apparent. It is in this manner that there are certain ideas and propofitions, which may be denominated innate; and that with as much prepriety, as our inclinations, difpofitions, and natural propenfities."

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The metaphyfical Reader will fee that this celebrated Writer gives a different turn to the doctrine of innate ideas, as laid down by Mr. Locke, and maintained by his followers. It is not for us, however, to say how far the fentiments of these two great philofophers are reconcileable, or how far thofe of either are confiftent with truth. But we must not difmifs this fubject, without obferving that the doctrine of a moral instinct, on which Hutchinson, Huine, and other late moralifts, have fo largely expatiated, is here fuggefted in the plaineft terms by Mr. Leibnitz: although he does by no means impute fo great an influence to it as the author of De la Nature, and fome other writers, who have adopted it.

The next important point, on which the author of the fyftem of the pre established harmony differs from Mr. Locke, relates to the nature and im materiality of the foul: which the former maintains to be conftantly thinking, and to be a fimple fubftance totally diftinct and different from matter. It is to the duration and prefence of this fubftance, alfo, that he imputes the perfonality or identity of the individual. Mr. Locke, it is true, differs from our Author in a great degree with regard to these particulars; we do not think, however, that the Leibnitzians do fict juftice to our English philofopher, in imputing to him the notion that matter is capable of thinking. Mr. Locke indeed hath faid, that he faw no reason why the omnipotence of the deity might not fuperadd a capacity of thinking to matter; but this is not faying that he conceived matter could think. And indeed the whole difpute is a cavil about words, if there be no fuch thing in nature as thefe philofophers conceived matter to be. At the fame time, we may challenge all the experimentalifts in Europe, to bring one phyfical proof, or even phyfical prefumption, that there is. It is indeed a little furprifing to us, that a philofopher, who fhould ever think of accounting for the phenomenon of extenfion, from unextended atoms, as Leibnitz hath done, fhould afterwards adopt the Newtonian principles of impenetrable, extended elements. To thofe, indeed, who conceive the doctrine of the immateriality of the foul intimately connected with that of its immortality, Mr. Locke's fuppofition will doubtle's appear exceptionable. But there is by no means any neceflary dependance or connexion between them. Mr. Locke fays, the great ends of religion and morality are fufficiently answered by the doctrine of the foul's immortality, without there being any neceffity to fuppofe its immateriality: and we may reverse the propofition, and fay for him, that, could it be proved that the foul was as material as the body really is, it would be no proof that it was not immortal, fo that the great ends of religion and morality dependant on that doctrine are equally fecured, be the problem determined either way.

It is to be obferved alfo, that, notwithstanding the apparent difference between the fyftems of Locke and Leibnitz, with regard to innate ideas, a very little matter of correction may perfectly reconcile them. For nothing can be plainer than that the latter means, by innate principles of thought, nothing more than an innate capacity of thinking. That the principles or motives of ratiocination, enabling the mind to draw regular conclufions from certain premifes, are innate, cannot be doubted; nor did Mr. Locke ever deny it, he only denied that fuch conclufions existed in the form of axioms already deduced. And thus geometrical truths are no more innate than moral, notwithstanding they are fo much more obvious and convincing. It feems as if the great perfpicuity and exactitude attending geometrical reafoning had led Mr. Leibnitz into this mistake: but we should reafon just as well on any other fubject or fcience, if the premises were equally clear. For we are not to conclude, because the mind reafons geometrically, that therefore it is originally furnished with geometrical knowlege. Even the obvious propofition, that two and two make four, is not a notion or idea, originally innate, notwithstanding its univerfality. It is true we find it impoffible to deny it; the mind revolting at fo abfurd a negation: but this arifes from the mode of operation which it neceffarily pursues in all kinds of reafoning. This mode muft, indeed, be of courfe innate, because immediately depending on the frame and conftitution of the mind but a very effential diftinction ought to be made between ideas themselves and our capacity for receiving them.

Of the other pieces contained in this volume we shall not trouble our Readers with any extract, they being all short, and little interesting to the generality of readers.

K.

Lettre a Monfieur *** relative a Monfieur J. J. Rousseau, &c.

Anecdotes relative to the Perfecution of J. J. Rouffeau by the Clergy in Switzerland; in a Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend; containing the Letters and Declarations of Mr. Rouffeau to the Affembly of the Clergy, the Confiftory of Elders, the Council of State, and the King's Attorney-general, on the Occafion. 12mo. 1765.

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ITTLE as we are difpofed to pity those who seem to court perfecution, we cannot help thinking poor Rousseau hath had hard measure dealt him by his fellow-countrymen, and (as he even still seems defirous of calling them) fellow-chriftians.

Neceffity,

Neceffity, however, feems at length to have determined him to a final expatriation; in the melancholy fearch of a more hofpitable foil; where he may be permitted to die in peace. Hard, indeed! to be denied the privilege of breathing his last in that air which he inspired at his birth! but fuch is the rage of Fanaticifm, that the perfecutes with equal fury the child of her womb, and the offspring of the most diftant ftranger.

Our Readers have, no doubt, been informed in general terms of Mr. Rouffeau's late fituation, after his having been obliged to retire from Geneva on account of the profecutions, or rather perfecution, carried on against him and his writings. The refuge he fought in the neighbouring principality of Neufchatel, hath, it feems, by no means anfwered his hopes and expectations. For, notwithstanding he was particularly honoured with the protection of the King of Pruffia, to whom that territory belongs, and no lefs favoured by the friendship of the Lord Marshall, the governor; neither the influence of the fovereign, nor of the adminiftration, was found fufficient to prevent his being perfecuted by the clergy, and infulted by the people. The government, it is true, appear to have had the power to prevent his being legally excommunicated and burnt at an Auto da fe: but, if we may credit the Author of this letter, he ran no little rifk of being torn to pieces by the populace; the most cruel and tyrannical of all human inftruments of vengeance!

The Author of the letter before us begins thus:

You defire of me, Sir, a particular account of the disturbance Mr. Rouffeau hath received and occafioned, in the new afylum he lately made choice of, in this principality. Indeed, I am not furprifed at your curiofity, nor to find you interest yourself fo greatly in the fituation of a writer, as famous for his misfortunes as celebrated for his merit. It would give too much pain, however, to an ingenuous mind, to enter minutely into the particular caufes of this disturbance; or to expofe the motives on which it is too juftly to be prefumed Mr. Rouffeau's enemies have proceeded. I fhall leave the recapitulation of thefe, therefore, to the fevere and cauftic pen of the fatirift; who may poffibly take a cruel pleasure in delineating a picture at once difgraceful to religion and humanity. From me you will receive only a faithful narrative of facts elucidated by a few annotations, and authenticated by copies of the original papers, which have appeared in the courfe of this extraordinary scene of inqui fitorial profecution.'

The Letter-writer proceeds to inform us, that, about the latter end of the year 1764, Mr. Rouffeau had closed with a proposal, made to him for the publication of a compleat edition of his works: a circumftance which it is faid gave great offence, from different motives, to many. About the fame time, alfo, came

out this Writer's Letters from the mountains; which laid the foundation for the perfecution that followed.

I need not tell you, Sir, with what avidity those letters were received by the public, nor that they were profcribed and burnt by the common executioner in various places. For our part, we remained very peaceable fpectators of thofe ridiculous bonfires, till about the end of February; when the zeal of our ecclefiaftics, which had fo long lain smothering in darkness, burst at once into a blaze. The aflembly of our clergy complained both to the adminiftration and the magiftracy, againft the faid letters; representing them as impious, fcandalous and heretical; foliciting withal the immediate profcription of them, as also the fuppreffion of the projected edition, and of the Author's works in general.'

The administration,' we are told, don't eafily take fire at fuch remonftrances, however overheated with the fury of inor dinate zeal. The civil magiftrate, nevertheless, took the matter into confideration, and fuppreffed the book; the officer entrusted with the bufinefs of crying it down, making a very whimsical blunder in the difcharge of his duty. The cause of their prohibition, as fpecified in the proclamation, was their having attacked every thing the most respectable in our holy religion: inftead of which the learned Mr. Town-clerk afferted that they attacked every thing the moft reprehenfible in our holy religion. This unlucky miftake had a droll effect on the auditors; and was thought by fome to have very luckily amended an error in the proclamation. The affembly indeed thought otherwise; and determined to proceed against the author; who, being advised of the great difturbance which the fermentation of this venerable body might caufe in the ftate, thought it his duty, as a good fubject, to endeavour to allay the ftorm. For this purpose, he tranfmitted the following declaration to Mr. Profeffor de Montmollin, the paftor of his church; in order to have it communicated to the affembly:'

"Out of the deference I owe to Profeffor de Montmollin, my paftor, and the refpect I bear to the venerable affembly of the clergy, I offer, if they will admit of it, to engage myself, by a writing figned with my own hand, never to publifh any new work relative to matters of religion; nor even to treat of religion, though ever fo curforily, in any new work, I may hereafter publifh on other fubjects: promifing farther to continue, both in fentiment and conduct, to difplay the value I fet upon the happiness of being united to the church.Mr. Profeffor is defired to communicate this declaration to the venerable affembly. J. J. Rouffeau." This declaration, it feems, the affembly determined to keep a profound fecret, even from thofe of their own body, who did

not