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country, in which they passed their early years. Hence, on entering a church, even when nobody is present, a considerate mind is apt to feel some of those religious impressions which it has formerly experienced in such places; and sentiments of a different nature arise, when we go into play houses, ball rooms, or apartments, that we have seen appropriated to purposes of festivity.

VI. Cause and Effect.

Things related as cause and effect, do mutually suggest each other to the mind. When we see a wound, we think of the weapon or the accident that caused it, and of the pain which is the effect of it. The idea of snow or of ice brings along with it that of cold; and we can hardly think of the sun without thinking of light and heat at the same time. The associations founded on this principle are equally strong, whether the causation be real or imaginary. He who believes that darkness and solitude are the cause of the appearance of ghosts, will find, when he is in the dark and alone, that the idea of such beings will occur to him as naturally, as if the one were really the cause of the other. It is true, that solitude and darkness may reasonably produce some degree of fear because where we cannot see, we must be in some danger; and, when every thing is silent about us, we must be at some distance from the protection and other comforts of society. But ghosts and apparitions have nothing more to do with darkness than with light and the stories told of them will be found on examination, to arise, either from imperfect sensations owing to the darkness, or from those horrors which disorder the imagination when one is very much afraid, or from the folly, credulity or falsehood of them who circulate those silly tales.

VII. Custom or Habit.

Custom or habit is a very extensive principle of association. Things and thoughts that have no other bond of union, may, by appearing together, or being frequently joined together, become so closely related, that the one shall ever after introduce the other into the mind. Thus, in language written or spoken, the mind instantly passes from the word heard, or from the characters seen, to the thing signified; custom having so associated them, that the one always reminds us of the other. Upon associations established by custom, many of the pains and pleasures of life depend. An indifferent thing may become very agreeable, or very much the contrary, according to the nature of the ideas thus connected with it; and in like manner, in consequence of some perverse association, that which ought to make us serious may incline us to laughter.

Things solemn and sacred therefore, should never be spoken of in terms of ridicule or levity; and places appropriated to the offices of religion, should never be made the scene of any thing ludicrous, trifling or unsuitable. Where these rules are not attended to, important and frivolous thoughts may be so jumbled together in the mind, as that the former, shall sometimes, very unseasonably, and indecently, suggest the latter. Let sacred things be always accompanied with serious language and solemn circumstances: and let those who wish to retain the government of their passions, and the command of their thoughts, be careful to check in the beginning every tendency to perverse and impure associations.

Dresses both ugly and inconvenient become fashionable; and custom reconciles us to the fashion, though at first, perhaps, it might appear ridiculous which is also owing to associations founded in custom.

For when we

have long seen a particular form of dress worn by persons whom we love and esteem, and on occasions of the greatest festivity or solemnity, it acquires in our mind a connexion with a great number of pleasing ideas; and whatever is so connected, must itself be pleasing. It will appear by and by, that, from associations founded in habit, many, or perhaps most, of those pleasing emotions are derived, which accompany the perception of that which in things visible is called Beauty.

Some people contract strange habits of what may be termed external associations, of joining together two actions that have no natural connexion, and appear. very awkward when they are so joined. You may have seen a boy button and unbutton his coat all the while he is repeating his catechism; and we have heard of a lawyer, who could not go on with his pleading, unless he was continually winding a piece of packthread around his finger. It should be our care to guard against these and the like absurd habits, and to be very thankful to those who caution us against them; for the eyes of a friend are, in a matter of this kind, much more to be depended on than

our own.

Intellectual habits and defects this way contracted, are not less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined either by education or much thought, whilst these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings will there be about separate spirits? Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity ?

Let the idea of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person, and these two constantly together possess the mind; and then one body, in two places at once, shall, unexamined, be received for a certain truth, by an implicit

faith, whenever that imagined infallible person dictates and demands assent without inquiry.

VIII. In different Sects.

Wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcileable opposition between different sects of Philosophy and Religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them, to a man, should knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, i e. to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings, and makes them not see the falsehood, of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reason, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of; some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more separate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one idea, and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, we had almost said of all the errors in the world; or if it does not reach so far, it is at "least the most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. When two things in themselves disjoined, appear to the sight constantly united; if the eye sees these things rivetted, which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two ideas, that they have been accustomed so to

join in their minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, perhaps, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error; and the confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connexion of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false

consequences.

CHAPTER X.

I. OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS.

OUR ideas, in reference to things whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent, come under a twofold distinction; and, are,

1st. Real or Fantastical;

2dly. Adequate or Inadequate.

Real ideas are such as have a foundation in Nature, such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes

Fantastical, are such as have no foundation in Nature, nor any conformity with that reality of being, to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes.

II. Ideas Adequate and Inadequate.

Real ideas are either adequate or inadequate.

First, Adequate, which perfectly represent those archetypes, which the mind supposes them taken from, which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them.

Secondly, Inadequate; which are such as do but partially or incompletely represent those archetypes to which they are referred.

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