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Sanford 7's. Sanford.

of formedon in descender, formedon in remainder, and formedon in reverter, of any lands, tenements, hereditaments, or any other writ, suit, or action whatsoever, at any time hereafter to be sued or brought, by occasion or means of any title or cause heretofore accrued, happened, or fallen, or which may hereafter descend, happen or fall, shall be sued and taken within seven years next after the passing of this act, or after the title and cause of action shall or may descend or accrue to the same, and at no time after the said seven years, and that no person or persons that now hath or have, or which hereafter may have, any right or title of entry into any lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall at any time hereafter make any entry but within seven years next after the passing of this act, or after his or their right or title shall or may descend or accrue to the same, and in default thereof, such persons so not entering, and their heirs, shall be utterly excluded and disabled from such entry after to be made." This is an act for quieting of men's estates, and for avoiding of suits, and it will be noted that it not only bars the right of action within seven years from the time the cause of action accrues, but also bars the right of action when there is any right of entry into any lands, tenements, etc.; that is to say, if any person has any right of entry into any lands or tenements, he must bring his action within seven years from the time such right of entry accrued to him, or he will be barred thereafter. The only exceptions made by the statute are in favor of "infants, feme coverts, persons non compos mentis, imprisoned, or beyond seas," and such persons had three years after the removal of disabilities to bring suit, and not after. The right to wait until the death of the tenant for life before bringing suit when there had been a forfeiture of the life estate which entitled the remaindermen to enter upon the land, is not one of the exceptions contained in the statute, and whatever may have been the decisions of the courts in other states and other countries, as to the right of the remaindermen to wait until the death of the tenant for life when there had been a forfeiture of the life estate which entitled them to enter immediately

VOL. LV. 35.

Sanford vs. Sanford.

upon the land, such is not the policy of our law, as declared by the statutes of the state. If a person has any right of entry on land in this state, by forfeiture, or otherwise, he must bring his action to enforce that right within seven years, or the statute will interpose its bar, unless the plaintiff comes within some one of the exceptions mentioned in the statute.

The defendant, and those under whom he claims, have been in the adverse possession of the land in dispute for nearly forty years, under written evidence of title and claim of right, and though the plaintiffs may have been infants when their right of entry first accrued as remaindermen, yet more than three years had elapsed after becoming of age before the commencement of their action, one of them at the trial being fifty years of age, and the other thirty-nine years old. It is the declared policy of our law to quiet men's estates in their land by protecting their adverse possession under written evidence of title after the lapse of seven years, and such was the view taken by the majority of this court in King vs. Leeves, 36th Georgia Reports, 199. The principles of the common law hereinbefore cited, in relation to the forfeiture of the estate of the tenant for life, when he attempted to convey a greater estate in the land than he had, was recognized in that case as being applicable to deeds of conveyance of land by bargain and sale, that mode of conveyance being suited to the circumstances of the people of this state; that the attempted conveyance of the tenant for life of the entire estate in fee simple by deed of bargain and sale, was an injury done to the remainder-men, prejudicial to their interest, as recognized by the common law of England, though not for the same reasons in all respects as existed there; that when any person who had any right of entry upon any lands or tenements, was bound by the positive requirement of the statute of the state to bring his action within seven years from the time his right of entry accrued to him, or be forever barred; that persons claiming as remaindermen were not excepted from the operation of the statute until the death of the tenant for life, if their right to

Sanford vs. Sanford.

enter on the land had accrued to them more than seven years before the death of the life tenant.

Such was, substantially, the ruling of the majority of the court in that case, and, in my judgment, that ruling was in accordance with the declared policy of our law in quieting and protecting men's estates in their land and in the possession thereof under written evidence of title, when such possession has been held adversely for more than seven years.

It was said on the argument of this case that the tenant for life could not convey a greater estate in the land than he had in it; that is true; he could not legally have done so, but it is because the tenant for life did illegally attempt to convey a greater estate than he had in the land to a stranger, to the injury and prejudice of the remaindermen, in violation of the deep-rooted principles of the common law, applicable to the circumstances of our people in this state and to their mode of conveying land here, that his life estate in the land became forfeited, and gave to the remaindermen the immediate right of entry thereon. The stranger to whom the land was conveyed in fee by the tenant for life, was under no obligation to preserve and protect it for the benefit of the remaindermen; he might render it worthless by improvident cultivation, and otherwise commit waste thereon, and that is a good and sufficient reason for the application of the principle of the common law in this state, which declares the life estate forfeited, and gives to the remaindermen the immediate right of entry on the land. The remaindermen are also injured and prejudiced by the attempted illegal conveyance of a fee simple title to the land by the tenant for life to a stranger, because it puts them to their action to recover possession of it, and the possession of the vendee of the entire estate, under written evidence of title, might ripen into a good statutory title.

The principle of the common law which forfeits the particular estate of the tenant for life when he attempts to convey the fee simple title to the land to a stranger, and gives to the remaindermen the immediate right of entry on the land, was a sound principle of law, and well suited to the circum

Sanford vs. Sanford.

stances of our people and to the conveyances of title to land recognized and of common use amongst them for a great number of years. This principle of the common law, when construed in connection with the provisions of the act of 1767, was well calculated to protect our people in the possession of their land which they had honestly purchased and paid for, against just such claims as the one now before us.

Without stopping to inquire what were all the reasons for the adoption of this wise provision of the common law in England, it is quite sufficient to state, on the authority of Blackstone, that such was the common law at the time of our adopting statute in 1784, and that it was well suited to the circumstances of our people and to the mode prescribed for the conveyance of land in this state by deeds of bargain and sale. The mode of conveying land in this state has nothing to do with the application of the common law principle here, that when a tenant for life attempts to convey in fee a greater estate in the land than he has in it that he thereby forfeits his life estate, and that the remaindermen may immediately enter thereon. The question to be answered is, was it the common law at the time of our adopting statute, and was it suited to the circumstances of our people, and to their mode of conveying land in this state? and if not, why not? The principle of the common law is, that if a particular tenant for life attempts to convey in fee to a stranger a greater interest in the land than he hath in it, he thereby forfeits his life estate, and the remaindermen may immediately enter thereon. Why should not that principle of the common law apply to a life estate in land with remainder to A and B, created by our mode of conveyance by deed of bargain and sale, as well as to a life estate in land with remainder over, which is created by any other mode of conveyance creating a similar estate? The principle of the common law is plain enough; the attempted conveyance by Sanford, the life tenant, of the fee simple estate in the land, to Gladdin, by a lawful deed of conveyance, is also plain enough; then, why did not that principle of the common law apply to that conveyance in this state and give

Sanford vs. Sanford.

the right to the remaindermen to have entered on the land immediately thereafter, the particular estate of the life tenant being forfeited? The remaindermen having had the right to have immediately entered on the land after the conveyance thereof by Sanford, the life tenant, to Gladdin, the statute of limitations then of force would have barred that right of entry within seven years after such right of entry accrued to them unless they were under the disability of infancy, and if they were, then they were bound to have brought their action to enforce their right of entry within three years after the disability of infancy was removed, and having failed to do so they are forever barred by the stern provisions of the statute.

There is no such exception in the statute, as was claimed, giving to the plaintiffs the right of entry, and a right of action to enforce the same within seven years from the death of the tenant for life in 1870, who had forfeited his life estate in the land in 1835. The error is in assuming that the statute of 1767 makes an exception in favor of remaindermen who have an immediate right of entry on the land upon the forfeiture of the life estate by the life tenant, by postponing their right of entry thereon until the death of the life tenant, whereas, the statute makes no such exception, but declares in express terms that no person or persons, who have any right or title of entry into any lands, and who fail to do so within seven years, shall be thereafter barred. The statute makes no provision for remaindermen to waive their right of entry on the land on the forfeiture of the life estate therein by the tenant for life until his death and then have the right to enter, but on the contrary, the statute contemplates that all persons who have any right of entry into lands, either by forfeiture or otherwise, must do so within seven years, or be barred. The statute does not contemplate successive rights of entry which might accrue to any class of persons from time to time, for its declared policy was to quiet men's estates in their lands, and for avoiding suits, and therefore the words any right of entry, as used in the statute, are significant words as to the intention of the legislature. The express words of the statute

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