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sometimes violate their trusts? And that it is sometimes necessary to put a bridle in the mouths of those agents who would overleap their duties? If no check is necessary, whence does it happen, that two branches have been deemed necessary in the legislative department? May not the same argument which we have heard, be applied to the inquiry-are not 126 men more competent to judge of the expediency of measures than 32? Why this check on the part of the senate? And this too, by men elected for four years, and acting counter to the sentiments of those who come fresh from their constituents, bearing with them the present sentiments of the people? The answer is easy. In the governor we place a sentinel over our rights to see that these representatives, or agents, perform their duty. If that sentinel gives a false alarm, or abuses his trust, it will soon be in our power to displace him, and transfer his duties to another. And is there any thing aristocratical in this? Or is it not a salutary measure, calculated exclusively for the benefit of the governed? My experience in legislation has not been great, but it has been sufficient to convince me, that men will bring into the chamber of legislation their prejudices and passions, and that these will sometimes betray the nicest honour, and obscure the soundest judgment. Hence it becomes necessary to resort to another tribunal, to correct its imperfection. It is wish legislation as with the administration of justice. It should be not only pure in fact, but unsuspected and satisfactory to the minds of the people. And what can give greater satisfaction to the public than to know, that the doings of its agents have been approved by the chief magistrate? But, sir, there is another consideration of peculiar weight on this question. And here I would recur to the primary principle of a republican government, that the will of the majority should govern, when fairly ascertained and clearly expressed. It is admitted, that under our present system, it is in the power of twenty, over one fourth of the votes, to control both branches of the legislature. But when the governor is constituted a coordinate branch, this event can never happen. He is elected by a majority of the people, and of course through him, every person in the state will possess a voice, and lend a sanction to every law that is passed. It is worthy of remark, that among all the forms of attack which the general government has sustained, the principle which is here engrafted from the federal constitution, has never been objected to. The honourable gentleman from Dutchess (Mr. L.) has referred to those states where no qualified veto exists. If a reference is made to the practice of those states, I think the gentleman will find but little cause for exultation. Where do you find stop-laws? Where those flagrant violations of the constitution, but in the states where this salutary check has not been provided? New-England has been referred to, by my honourable friend, to justify his motion. Sir, the people of New-England are a peculiar people. Descended from the same ancestry-embarked in the same cause-employed in the same pursuits-connected and distinguished by the same habits and associations, they are like a band of brothers, and the laws which are required to govern thei are altogether unfitted for the regulation of an incongruous population like ours. I have long been sensible, in common with a large class of the community, that we have too much legislation. It renders the law unstable, and it requires a good lawyer to keep pace with the construction it receives. All that the governor can say, when vested with the powers contemplated by the committee, is—stay your hand. If gentlemen are afraid that we shall not have law enough, let them go to the lawyers' shelves and tables that groan beneath the burden. An erroneous idea seems to have prevailed in relation to the powers and origin of the governor. Who is he? and by whom is he appointed? Does he derive his authority from the king of Great Britain? Is he an usurper? If so, let us unite to depose him. But, sir, he is the man of the people-elected by their suffrage, and identified with their interests. He is a watchful sentinel to guard us from evil, and a zealous friend to admonish us of error. Much has been said respecting the necessity of keeping separate the different branches of the government. I yield a cordial acquiescence to the principle. But if we content ourselves with parchment regulations-if nothing more effectual is done than to authorise the governor to recommend a reconsideration of the bills that are parsed, it is easy to perceive that the weaker power will be trodden down

by the stronger, and that the executive has become a cypher before the representatives of the people. On this, as on all other subjects, however, I have but one object in view. That object is to endeavour that the agents of the public are so guarded, checked, and controled, that the people may lie down and rest in security, with the consciousness that their rights will be protected.

GEN. ROOT. It has been well observed, that it is an important question which is now submitted to the consideration of this Convention. It is important, because it involves the fundamental principles of government; and if, in its consequences, those principles of free government which it embraces, should be hastily trodden under foot, it will be cause for mourning. I say, sir, that if it shall be determined that neither the people nor their representatives have power to decide upon their own actions, it will be cause for mourning.

I have listened, sir, with much attention to the handsome encomium which the honourable gentleman from Oneida (Mr. Platt) has been pleased to bestow upon the council of revision; and I had even travelled with him so far, that I had almost lost sight of the question before the committee.

It has been said, sir, by the honourable gentleman, that of one hundred and twenty-eight bills which have been returned by the council with their objections, only seventeen have finally pessed by the constitutional majority of twothirds. What does this prove? It proves that in seventeen cases out of one hundred and twenty eight, a majority of two-thirds of both branches of the legislature have been of the opinion that the council of revision did not care for the people, or would not listen to their voice. We have been told, that on the return of bills, the legislature have often been unanimous in assenting to the objections which the council have made. What can we infer from this? That a disposition exists in the representatives of the people to acquiesce, whenever their attention is drawn to the unconstitutionality of a bill. It also shews, that it is not necessary to require the assent of two-thirds of the legislature, as is contemplated in the report before the committee, for if the legislature has been incautiously involved in error, they are ready to retract it. But we are informed of a certain silent, secret operation of the council of revision, which has been extremely beneficial to the public welfare. The annals of the state, sir, and the recollections of gentlemen will shew, that the operations of that body have not been altogether of a silent and negative character. Witness the informal amendments of midnight. Witness the various other acts of a positive character, which have aroused the indignation of the people, and made even Felix tremble. The inscription prepared for its tomb is written on the journals; and I am willing to leave it to posterity to weave those garlands which shall decorate its grave. It is gone, sir, and what is its substitute?

It is proposed to refer the powers of the council to the governor; and it seems to be feared that the executive will too far bend to popular opinion. Sir, I deprecate that firmness which grows out of an independence of the popular voice, to oppose the popular will. But before we discuss the manner in which this veto may be exercised, it may be proper to consider in what it consists, and what has been its history and progress. The framers of our constitution had received their education under the system of British government, and with a deep veneration for British law. It is not extraordinary, therefore, that we should find them talking of royal negatives. Indeed, sir, we ascertain indubitable traces of the British constitution throughout the whole of our own. The check here proposed is not positive, but qualified; for the experience of all states has shown the folly of permitting an unqualified veto to reside in any branch of the government. And we find constitutions of the states more perfect, the later the period in which they have been made.-That of Connecticut, which is the last, is in my judgment the most perfect. It has provided, that when a bill has been returned by the governor with his objections, the ayes and noes shall be recorded, and if a majority of both houses adhere to their vote, the bill shall become a law; the governor's objections to the contrary notwithstanding.

But in England, sir, from whence our idea of a negating power scems to be drawn, all laws are supposed to be derived from the king, and are enacted in the name of his most royal majesty. Many reigns intervened after the con

The necessity of a check of this kind, was not because legislative bodies were always, or even usually, disposed to transcend and abuse their authority, or to err in the exercise of it, but because, from their organization, they were sometimes liable to act hastily and unadvisedly, from the impulse of passion, or from temporary excitement. These were evils to which popular assemblies were naturally prone, and against which they could not at all times be guarded. It was, therefore, wise and prudent, that there should be a check lodged somewhere, of sufficient energy to control the legislature when impelled by passion, or influenced and operated upon by improper views; or with a disposition to encroach upon the other departments.

In the government of the United States, we have a precedent which certainly ought to be received with deference and respect by all. The adoption of the federal constitution was warmly and vehemently opposed by a large proportion of the people of this state. It was supposed by very many, to be hostile to our interests, and every one of its provisions was scanned and scrutinized with the greatest caution and severity; and though the most of the articles were considered more or less exceptionable, yet throughout the whole of the discussions, no one ever thought of making any objection to the qualified veto which it gave to the president. Thus have the people of this state twice most solemnly and deliberately approved of the principle for which he contended; once in the formation of our state constitution, and again in the adoption of the federal constitution.

GEN. TALLMADGE wished to add but a few remarks to those which had already been made. He urged the caution which ought to be observed in approaching the constitution. Upon every question that may arise in our progress, we ought to proceed with care and deliberation; and when we determine a point, we should do it with great circumspection, to see whether, as far as can be, we shall preserve the principles of good government, and the spirit of our present constitution. When gentlemen declare the embarrassment they feel; and speak of the magnitude of the duties committed to our charge, the conclusion to be drawn, is, that greater moderation was required; that we should pull down with the greater caution; that we should so alter as to correct the omissions and mistakes, and yet preserve the spirit, and as far as may be, the form of the present constitution; with such views, the select committee had only proposed to sever the judiciary from the council of revision, retaining, however, that feature in the government, and they had adopted the language of the constitution of the United States, from its simplicity of expression, and because the experience of the nation had given it construction. It has been remarked, that yesterday we abolished this part of the constitution; and it has been asserted on this floor, that the vote of this house and the report of the select committee, was founded on the misconduct of the judges and the odium attached to their characters. He believed that no such motive influenced the majority of this Convention in their vote of yesterday; and it is due to the select committee of which he had the honour to be chairman, to say, that in recommending the abolishment of the council of revision, and the adoption of the report which they had presented, they had acted with the sole view of separating the departments of government, and preserving the great principles of the constitution, and not under a belief that they were sapping its foundations. He disclaimed on his own part, and on the part of the committee, any intention by the recommendation which they had made, to pass any censure on the judiciary. It was not the province of the select committee to pass censure. They had looked at the great principles of government, and had unanimously agreed in the propriety of separating the judiciary from the legislative departmentconnected as they now were, it implicated them in the strifes and contentions of politics. Separate them from legislative and confine them to their judicial duties. It will leave them uncommitted, to pass upon such laws as may come before them. The rights of individual citizens ought not to be prejudged by persons in the council of revision, nor until such citizens shall have been heard by themselves or their counsel, before the judges in their judicial capacity. Make the separation; it will free them from attacks and imputations which lessen the influence of the judiciary system. It will operate as a kindness towards

that distinguished branch of the government. They ought not to be the defenders or the defamers of this or of that man. Set them apart for the performance of their particular duties. And let us hope hereafter, that the public may only know the judges by their judicial determinations.

It was with these views that the committee thought proper to separate the judiciary from the council of revision. As rumours had already gone abroad that the council of revision had been abolished from a disrespect to the judiciary, he deemed this explanation due to the committee, to shield them from the imputation of false motives. He regretted that the honourable gentleman from Oneida (Mr. Platt) had thought proper to introduce into his argument the subject of an epitaph upon the council of revision, or to excite compassion for a part of the constitution, which he was willing to see go down silently to the tomb of oblivion. We did not come here to write inscriptions, or to pronounce eulogiums on the living or the dead. We had assembled from different parts of the state, possessing a knowledge of the interests, views, and sentiments of our constituents, for the purpose of establishing a system of government, which shall be permanent in its duration, and provide for the exigencies of the com munity.

Any government, he said, was a libel on man. If there were no weakness, no frailty, no corruption in human nature, governments would be unnecessary. The very idea of government, therefore, supposed that it was to operate as a restraint upon the vicious and the profligate, and that all its provisions should be based upon this fundamental principle.

He then went into an examination of the several departments of government, and the importance of keeping them distinct. The experience of all ages and all countries convinced us of the necessity of checks and balances in the or ganization of governments, and of giving to one branch a restraining power upon the others. Wherever this has not been done, the power of one department has become exorbitant, and invariably ended in tyranny. Such was the depravity of man, that restraints were in all cases found necessary to check bim in his disposition to acquire power and to trample on the rights and liber ties of others.

In the establishment of our system of government these great principles were woven into our constitution. The several departments were intended to act as checks upon each other. In the organization of the legislature, it was thought advisable that there should be two branches-the senate and assembly, that the one might control and check the abuses of the other, and prevent either from acquiring an overwhelming and dangerous power, if such a disposition should ever be manifested. As an additional safeguard to the rights and liber- ties of the people, a third branch of the legislature, the council of revision, was instituted. Its object was to resist the encroachments of the senate and assembly, whether through error or corruption, upon the other branches of the government, as well as upon the rights of the citizen, to prevent all, all, from being swallowed up by the inordinate power of the legislature. This third and supervising power was not only defensive in its nature, but it was a power to guard the people against hasty and improvident legislation.

Without this power of a veto over the bodies of legislation, in vain may you boast of the independence of your judiciary, and in confirmation point to the fixed tenure of their places, till sixty years, or even for life. Remember that the power over the subsistence, is a power over the will of man. When you have secured to them the tenure of their places, you scem to have provided for their safety because you have placed them in a citadel which cannot be stormed: but yet you have artfully retained in the legislative body, the means of their subsistence, and the power to starve them into submission. Let them venture on the integrity of their conduct to come in collision, or to thwart the legislative will, and attempt to break down some law which may violate the constitution, or have for its object the destruction of the other branches of government, and the grasping at all power, it will be then that the legislative body will show to the judiciary its dependence, and that although holding a citadel which cannot be sacked, yet their subsistence and their existence while there, is at the pleasure of that body which they vainly attempt to withstand. When

such a crisis shall arrive, some modern Cæsar, with a senate at his heels, may control, by his cunning and his influence, the majority in your bodies of legislation, and thus throw down the fabric of your government. I beseech you to preserve the proposed check, and thus provide against the ascendant powers of either corruption or inordinate ambition.

He considered the sheet anchor of our safety to be the wholesome principle that the majority should govern, and to this he would hold.-But the will of the majority was to be fairly expressed by the representatives of the people, in the several departments of our government, and not by the democracy in its collective capacity. Found your government upon equal rights, and extended suffrage. Clothe its officers with all requisite powers, and provide for their direct and immediate accountability to the people themselves. Upon this system, the representatives of the people will rise like the wave of the ocean, which exists for a scason, rolls onward until its functions are performed, and then again subsides into the great source from which it originated. There was in this respect a wide distinction between this country and the ancient republics. In the former, the interests and sentiments of the community are represented by delegates-in the latter, the people assembled en masse, to conduct their political affairs.-The fate of ancient republics should warn us against the danger of all democracies. Their liberties were lost by the licentiousnessof the people, upon which their governments provided no check. The veto, and final adoption of laws was lodged in the collective mass of the people, and was exercised with that indiscretion' and madness, which always characterize such tumultuous assemblies.

It was these popular assemblies where the laws received either the approv ing voice of the people, or were rejected, that called forth the powers of Demosthenes. These popular assembles were the schools of the eloquence of ancient times, and the causes of their country's ruin. Let us avoid the rock on which other states have been wrecked; and while we manifest a becoming confidence in the intelligence and virtue of the people, let us never abolish those checks, which are necessary to preserve us from the encroachments of power.

His honourable colleague had enumerated several of our sister states, in in whose governments no qualified negative on the acts of the legislature had been provided. The constitutions of those states had been cited as models for our own. But he would ask when these governments were adopted, and what had been their operation? Many of them, like our own, were established, to use the language of his colleague, amidst the noise of musketry and the thunder of cannon. Experience had proved them defective in many important points, and they ought not to be cited as precedents. Among others, the new constitution of Connecticut had been mentioned as an example for us. There was a wide difference between the population of that state and of this. They were emphatically one people, peculiar in their habits, customs, and manners. They were descended from one stock, and were united by an identity of interests and feelings. The people of this state, on the contrary, were descended from different states, and collected together from every country and every nation under heaven. There was an almost infinite variety of interests, sentiments, and feelings in the community; and hence the same government which was adapted to the people of Connecticut, would not answer for New-York. It had been found by an experience of many years, that at times there had been encroachments by our legislature-It had since been charged with corruption. This was a point which he trusted his honourable colleague (Mr. L.) would not controvert; and this being admitted, it would not be denied, that is was both wise and safe to guard against the dangers of such encroachments. In illustration of this, he cited the cases, which had been stated by his honourable friend from Westchester (Mr. Jay.) on the floor this morning, by which it appeared that money had frequently been drawn from the treasury-lands had been conveyed-the school fund meddled with-the attorney-general, and even the governor himself directed in his duties by the concurrent resolutions of the two houses of the legislature. He trembled while he reflected on these alarming strides of power. Such liberties with the treasury and the government,

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