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fore unlawfully entering into a miscegenetic marriage has been held sufficient to justify a refusal of its aid by a court of equity to a party thereto seeking the annulment of such a marriage. Marre v. Marre (1914) 184 Mo. App. 198, 168 S. W. 636.

In Schaffer v. Krestovnikow (1917) 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246, judgment affirmed on rehearing in (1918) 88 N. J. Eq. 523, 103 Atl. 913, and on appeal in (1918) - N. J. Eq. -> 105 Atl. 239, it was held that, if the cohabitation of a man with a woman for a considerable number of years was criminal, he having married her during the life of her former husband after having convinced her that she was not legally married to the former husband under the laws of the foreign country in which her prior marriage had been celebrated, he was in court with "unclean hands," having continued the cohabitation long after the death of such former husband, and with the knowledge thereof, in seeking the annulment of his own marriage to her on the ground that she was a married woman at the time of his marriage to her, which fact was then unknown to him.

In Ewald v. Ewald (1914) 219 Mass. 111, 106 N. E. 567, wherein the plaintiff, in a suit to procure the annulment of her marriage to the defendant, pleaded that the marriage had been entered into contrary to law, in that the parties to the suit, in order to evade the law of the forum, had gone into another state, and were married before the expiration of the period during which the defendant was, by the lex fori, prohibited from remarrying after the granting to a former wife of a divorce from him, it was held that she was in "unclean court with hands," and not entitled to the relief prayed.

Where the bill and exhibits in a suit in equity in ejectment showed on their face that the suit was being prosecuted solely for the benefit of the vendee, a court of equity will not give relief to the vendee in a champertous deed merely because the vendee saw proper to join the vendor as a co-complainant, the latter, as a part of the contract of sale, having agreed to as

sist the vendee without liability for costs to the vendor, to obtain a recovery of the land conveyed in the deed, which was declared by a statute to be void, the land being then in the possession of a third person, the defendant, and held by him under color of title. The complainants were held to be in court with "unclean hands," and disentitled to the relief prayed. Lenoir v. Mining Co. (1889) 88 Tenn. 168, 14 S. W. 378.

3. Qualification of rule.

However, where an illegal agreement is not directly connected with the matter in litigation, a court of equity will not refuse its aid to a party against whom the illegal agreement is set up, on the theory that such party is in court with "unclean hands." Yale Gas Stove Co. v. Wilcox (1894) 64 Conn. 101, 25 L.R.A. 90, 42 Am. St. Rep. 159, 29 Atl. 303, wherein a contract for the sale of certain patents to a joint-stock company organized for the manufacture and sale of the patented article was held illegal as being a violation of the "joint-stock law" of the state. In an action to hold the promoter accountable to the company for secret profits realized on the sale of the patents to the company, based upon the concealment from the latter of the fact of an agreement between the promoter and the patentee to divide the proceeds of the sale, it was held that the illegality of the contract made by the company for the purchase of the patent was so unconnected with the matter in litigation as not to bar the relief sought in the action by the company under the principle of "unclean hands."

In Kinner v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. (1902) 23 Ohio C. C. 294, an unlawful combination or conspiracy between railroads to suppress competition in their business was held not to deprive a railroad of the right to relief in a suit to restrain one engaged in the railroad-ticket brokerage business from selling tickets of the plaintiff, purchased by him from passen

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not to deprive a party thereto of the right to relief in equity.

In Snell v. Snell (1915) 191 Ill. App. 239, the suit was to have a decree of divorce set aside and an annulment of

the marriage decreed on the ground that the defendant had formerly been married and divorced, and had married the complainant before the expiration of the period following the said decree of divorce within which he was prohibited by law from contrast ing a valid marriage. The fact that her marriage to the defendant was void, it was alleged, was unknown to the complainant until some time after the date on which her bill for a divorce

was granted. It was contended by the defendant that the complainant was not in court with "clean hands," for the reason that she did not allege in her complaint that she did not know of the former marriage and divorce of the defendant at the time of procuring her divorce. The court held that it was immaterial to the complainant's right to relief whether she knew of the defendant's prior marriage and divorce within the time prohibited by law for remarrying, and that it was therefore unnecessary for her to allege that she did or did not have knowledge of such prior marriage and divorce.

In ARADO V. ARADO (reported herewith) ante, 28, the principle of "unclean hands" was held to be inapplicable to a suit for divorce, wherein the defendant asked the court to annul the marriage on the ground that the parties thereto were so related as to make their marriage one of persons within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity.

In Gargano v. Pope (1904) 184 Mass. 571, 100 Am. St. Rep. 575, 69 N. E. 343, it appeared that the plaintiff nad been represented by certain of the defendants as her attorneys 'n an action against the other defendants for damages for the death of her usband by the wrongful act of the last named defendants. The agreement between the plaintiff and the attorneys was champertous. It was held that the plaintiff was none the less entitled to have it set aside and to recover money withheld by the attorneys thereunder.

IV. Breach of trust or confidence.

A court of equity will not aid one who, standing in a relation of confidence to another, commits acts in violation of his trust which, are immediately connected with the subjectmatter of the litigation. Pendleton v. Gondolf (1915) 85 N. J. Eq. 308, 96 Atl. 47; Helsley v. Fultz (1882) 76 Va. 675.

Thus, in Pendleton v. Gondolf (N. J.) supra, the court said: "It is a maxim of equity that he who comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands; and in the ordinary application of that maxim a court of equity denies its remedies to a complainant who has been guilty of bad faith, fraud, or unconscionable acts in the transaction which forms the basis of his suit."

In Farley v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. (1882) 14 Fed. 114, it was held that a receiver of railroad properties, who, by the aid of information acquired in his official capacity, conceived a plan to gain control of the property, was not in a position to obtain equitable relief from his associates in the fraudulent design. In Farley v. Kittson (1887) 120 U. S. 303, 30 L. ed. 684, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, that decision was reversed on the ground that the facts on which it was predicated were not so pleaded as to be before the court.

In Livingston v. Cochran (1878) 33 Ark. 294, the specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate was denied to one who conspired with certain real estate dealers and with a judge, who was also a dealer in real estate, and who had ordered and approved the sale, to stifle competitive bidding at the sale, the judge bidding in the property and disguising the bid by having it returned in the name of the assignor of the plaintiff.

In Semonin v. Duerson (1891) 13 Ky. L. Rep. 169, it appeared that the attorneys for the parties to an action at law agreed on a compromise judgment, unknown to one of the parties to the litigation, the defendant in the instant suit, and the fact that the judgment was a compromise judgment did not appear of record. Later an appeal was taken from that judgment, and it

was reversed. It was held in a suit in equity to enforce the judgment as reversed, that the complainant, in procuring the reversal, had acted unfairly, and was not therefore in court with "clean hands," nor entitled to the relief prayed.

In Pitre v. Haas (1903) 110 La. 163, 34 So. 361, it was held that one connected with the tax collector's or assessor's office, who, with others, also holding official positions, was engaged in speculating in the purchase of lands sold at tax sales, could not obtain the assistance of a court of equity in making use of the opportunities which his position afforded him of obtaining advantages working in his own favor, to the injury of others.

In Pendleton v. Gondolf (1915) 85 N. J. 308, 96 Atl. 47, it was held that a party to a "wire-tapping" scheme which involved the corruption of a supposed employee of a telegraph company was not entitled to equitable relief against one of his confederates.

In York v. Searles (1904) 97 App. Div. 331, 90 N. Y. Supp. 37, affirmed in (1907) 189 N. Y. 573, 82 N. E. 1134, one who was secretly under contract with another to sell on a commission basis the plant of an insolvent business corporation at an agreed price, which would cover the entire indebtedness of the corporation, was held to have been guilty of a breach of duty and lack of good faith, and therefore to be in court with "unclean hands" in seeking to enforce a contract which he had entered into with another to secure for the latter an option on the said plant, and in consideration of his services to receive an equal share of the promotion profits of a new corporation to be organized, because of his concealment of the fact of the existence of the first-mentioned contract.

In Flanagan v. Duncan (1890) 133 Pa. 373, 7 L.R.A. 412, 19 Atl. 405, the suit was instituted by one partner to an adventure, against his copartner, for contribution of the latter's proportionate share of a judgment rendered against the partnership in a suit arising out of the adventure and paid by the plaintiff. It was held that the

plaintiff was not in court with "unclean hands" because he had allowed the defendant to believe for years that the suit in which the judgment was rendered had been abandoned.

In Snow v. Blount (1903) 182 Mass. 489, 65 N. E. 845, it appeared that the complainant had, by collusion with the administrator, procured a private conveyance of property of the estate, the administrator falsely representing the facts to the court. It was held that he was not entitled to sue for the cancelation of a mortgage on the property.

In Gilmore v. Thomas (1913) 252 Mo. 147, 158 S. W. 577, an executor who had purchased for himself property of the estate was denied the aid of equity to reform the deed and quiet his title.

In Sternberger v. Young (1907) 73 N. J. Eq. 586, 75 Atl. 807, a real estate agent who had colluded with the prospective customer to sell at a reduced price for a consideration to himself was held not to be entitled to the aid of equity to recover that consideration.

In Binkley v. Nolt (1911) 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 531, it appeared that an administrator fraudulently permitted a judgment to be rendered against the estate, to deceive creditors. It was held that he was not entitled to have the judgment vacated.

In Shotwell v. Stickle (1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 188, 90 Atl. 246, it appeared that the executors of an estate agreed that one of them should purchase the property of the decedent at the executors' sale, and this was done, and the deed thereto was executed in the name of the wife of such executor. The wife subsequently died, leaving her brothers as her heirs at law. It was held, in a suit for the partition of the property, instituted by the heirs against the quondam executors, who were also the children of the decedent, that the principle of the maxim had no application, the act of the executor in purchasing the property at the executors' sale not having any connection with the mat-ter in litigation.

V. Fraud.

a. General rule.

To entitle a party to the aid of a court of equity under the principle of the maxim, "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands," he must be free from the imputation of fraud connected with the matter in controversy. Castroville Co-Op. Creamery Co. v. Col (1907) 6 Cal. App. 533, 92 Pac. 649; A. N. Chamberlain Medicine Co. v. H. A. Chamberlain Medicine Co. (1909) 43 Ind. App. 213, 86 N. E. 1025; Wertheimer-Swartz Shoe Co. v. Wyble (1914) 261 Mo. 693, 170 S. W. 1128; Fetridge v. Wells (1857) 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 144; Prince Mfg. Co. v. Prince's Metallic Paint Co. (1892) 135 N. Y. 24, 17 L.R.A. 129, 31 N. E. 990; Fay v. Lambourne (1908) 124 App. Div. 245, 108 N. Y. Supp. 874, order affirmed without opinion in (1909) 196 N. Y. 575, 90 N. E. 1158; Binkley v. Nolt (1911) 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 535.

Thus, in A. N. Chamberlain Medicine Co. v. H. A. Chamberlain Medicine Co. (1909) 43 Ind. App. 1025, 86 N. E. 1025, the court said: "It is an ancient and equitable rule that 'he who comes into a court of equity must come with pure hands and a pure conscience;' and it is also well established by the authorities that if a complainant in a court of equity claims relief against the fraud or imposition of others, he must himself be free from the same charge with reference to the same matter."

In Fetridge v. Wells (1857) 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 144, the court said: "Those who come into a court of equity, seeking equity, must come with pure hands and a pure conscience. If they claim relief against the fraud of others, they must be free themselves from the imputation."

In the application of the principle of this maxim, therefore, a court of equity will not protect a party to litigation before it who has perpetrated a fraud on another in connection with the matter in litigation.

United States.-Farley v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. (1882) 14 Fed. 117; Primeau v. Granfield (1911) 114 C. C. A. 549, 193 Fed. 911, writ of certiorari

denied in (1912) 225 U. S. 708, 56 L. ed. 1267, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 839. Georgia.-Peacock v. Terry (1850)

9 Ga. 147.

Illinois. Blackburn v. Bell (1879) 91 Ill. 434.

Maryland.-Roman v. Mali (1875) 42 Md. 513.

Michigan. Dakin v. Rumsey (1895) 104 Mich. 636, 62 N. W. 990.

Missouri.-Seibel v. Higham (1909) 216 Mo. 137, 129 Am. St. Rep. 502, 115 S. W. 987.

New Jersey.-Pendleton v. Gondolf (1915) 85 N. J. Eq. 308, 96 Atl. 50. North Carolina. - Pinckston Brown (1857) 56 N. C. (3 Jones, Eq.) 494.


Pennsylvania.-Rice v. Findlay Co. (1910) 19 Pa. Dist. R. 601.

Tennessee.-C. F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co. (1893) 93 Tenn. 94, 23 S. W. 165.

Texas.-Sanders v. Cauley (1908) 52 Tex. Civ. App. 261, 113 S. W. 560.


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Thus, in Farley v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. (1882) 14 Fed. 117, wherein the parties to the suit were in pari delicto, the court said: "Courts will not and ought not to be made the agencies whereby frauds are to be in any respect recognized aided. Courts of equity will not recognize as valid, enforce, any agreement grounded in turpitude; nor will it undertake to unravel a tangled web of fraud for the purpose of enabling one of the fraudulent parties, after such judicial disentanglement, to consummate his fraudulent designs. The party complaining must come before the court with clean hands."


In Primeau v. Granfield (1911) 114 C. C. A. 549, 193 Fed. 911, writ of certiorari denied in (1912) 225 U. S. 708, 56 L. ed. 1267, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 839, it was said: "He that cometh into equity must have clean hands. He that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity. He that hath engaged in a fraudulent enterprise cannot com plain that his associate in fraud has not kept the faith."

In Blackburn v. Bell (1879) 91 Ill. 434, it was said: "Appellants and appellee went hand in hand in the commission of a fraud. They must

abide the result; for if the wrongful acts have resulted in harm to one party and profit to the other, then equity will not relieve the wrongdoers from the consequences of their own conduct, even against their fellow wrongdoer. The court of chancery will touch nothing that is impure, but will close its doors against all who seek to come within its portals with unclean hands, and will leave them to their naked legal rights, as best they may be able to get them, in the court of law."

In Roman v. Mali (1875) 42 Md. 561, wherein it was said: "Such, then, being the case, it falls directly within the well-established principle that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands; and if a party seeks to cancel or set aside an instrument, or be relieved of a transaction, or recover property, on the ground of fraud, and he himself has been guilty of a wilful participation in the fraud, equity will not interpose in his behalf. This principle, it has been said, is founded in the soundest wisdom and policy of the law, and it has been applied and enforced by the courts with great uniformity."

In Nelson v. J. H. Winchell & Co. (1909) 203 Mass. 83, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1150, 89 N. E. 180, a suit to restrain the alleged infringement of a trademark of the plaintiff, who was a jobber in shoes, by the defendants, who manufactured for the plaintiff the shoes on which the latter placed his trademark, the defense interposed was that the plaintiff, in his trademark, misrepresented himself as the manufacturer. The court, in denying relief, said: "This is but an application of the common maxim that he who seeks equity must come into court with clean hands. If his case discloses fraud, deception, or misrepresentation on his own part, relief will be denied to him."

It has been held that the fraud which will justify a court of equity in applying the principle of the maxim need not be actionable fraud.

Thus, in Harton v. Little (1914) 188 Ala. 640, 65 So. 951, the court said: "For a court of equity to deny relief

for misconduct on the part of complainant, it is not essential that the fraud or deceit be such as would be a defense to an action at law, or even that it should be such as would require a court of equity to cancel the contract, as appears from quotation herein quoted from § 400, Pom. Eq. Jur. vol. 1. If he has nevertheless been guilty of unscrupulous practices, or overreaching, or has concealed important facts, even though not actually fraudulent, or been guilty of trickery, or taking undue advantage of his position, or other unconscientious conduct, then a court of equity may deny relief, although such may not constitute a defense at law."

The party to a suit, complaining that his opponent is in court with "unclean hands" because of a fraud perpetrated by the latter in the transaction out of which the litigation arose, or with which it is connected, must show that he himself has been injured thereby, to justify the application of the principle to the case.


TIMBER Co. v. FISHER (reported herewith) ante, 9; Langdon v. Templeton (1893) 66 Vt. 173, 182, 28 Atl. 866. And see LANGLEY V. DEVLIN (reported herewith) ante, 32.

The fraud complained of need not have been perpetrated on a party to the transaction out of which the suit arose, but may be such as was directed solely against third persons, who were the parties to the suit complaining thereof. Barnes v. Starr (1894) 64 Conn. 136, 154, 28 Atl. 980, wherein the court, after referring to this maxim and others included within its operation, said: "A very numerous class of cases coming within the same equitable doctrine is where the contract or other act is substantially a fraud upon the rights, interests, or intentions of third parties. In a case of this kind, relief is refused to a plaintiff on the ground that he does not come into court with clean hands. The general rule is that the parties to a contract must act not only bona fide between themselves, but that they shall not act mala fide in respect to other persons who stand in such a relation to either as to be affected by the contract or its consequences."

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