Axiomatic models of bargaining
Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers.
iv, 121 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
9783540095408, 3540095403
5410955
I: Nash’s Model of Bargaining.- Section A. Introduction.- Section B. The Formal Model and Axiomatic Derivation.- Section C. Probabilistic Models.- Section D. Risk Posture.- II: Other Models of Bargaining.- Section A. A Critical Evaluation of the Independence Properties.- Section B. Ordinal Models of Bargaining.- Section C. Interpersonal Models of Bargaining.- Section D. “Irrelevant” Alternatives.- Appendix: Summary of the Principal Properties and Results.