Two-sided matching : a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis
This book provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions
Print Book, English, 1990
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [England], 1990
Econometric Society monographs, no. 18
xiii, 265 pages ; 24 cm.
9780521390156, 9780521437882, 052139015X, 0521437881
20800542
1. Introduction
Part I. One-to-one matching: The marriage model
2. Stable matchings
3. The structure of the set of stable matchings
4. Strategic questions
Part II. Many-to-one matching: Models in which firms may employ many workers
5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns
6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences
Part III. Models of one-to-one matching with money as a continuous variable
7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers
8. The assignment game
9. A generalization of the assignment model
Part IV. Epilogue
10. Open questions and research directions